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principally to the period of the presidency of John Quincy Adams and the period when Henry Clay was the Secretary of State.

STATEMENTS, INTERPRETATIONS, AND APPLICATIONS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND OF MORE OR LESS ALLIED DOCTRINES, FROM 1823 TO 1845

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In January of 1824, the month following the publication of the message containing the declarations later known as the Monroe Doctrine, an attempt was made to have Congress endorse the sentiments of the Executive. For this purpose Clay, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, caused a resolution to be introduced declaring:

That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the Allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.¹

Congress refused to take action on the resolution, but Clay did not at once abandon his hope. Five months later, however, he announced that he "should continue to abstain from pressing upon the attention of the House his resolution" because events had shown that the apprehended attack by the European Powers on the American states had been abandoned, if such had ever been seriously entertained.² "Mr. Poinsett, of South Carolina, made a like attempt later, but with no more success. The Congress of that day," says Professor Burgess, "had altogether too much intelligence to make diplomatic opinions, advanced by the Administration, either laws of the land, or joint or concurrent resolutions of the legislative department of the Government."³

¹Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 340.

²Moore, *International Law Digest*, VI, 405.

³Burgess, *The Middle Period*, 128.

In the last annual message of President Monroe, that of December, 1824, he reaffirmed the policy announced a year previously, declaring:

We can have no concern in the wars of the European governments nor in the causes which produce them. * * * But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns, * * * without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us.⁴

"The Spanish Americans had taken the cautious utterances of President Monroe * * * for much more than he meant them. They thought, or professed to think, that the government had pledged itself to meet any intervention of the Allied Powers of Europe in American affairs by any resistance necessary to defeat it."⁵ On December 6, 1823, only four days after Monroe's famous utterance, the Mexican chargé in the United States, wrote from Philadelphia telling of the reception of the message. He quoted the significant clauses, said they were very popular and were applauded by all the public papers, and declared that they meant the United States would break their neutrality in case any Power should aid Spain to conquer America. Already, he added, ships were ordered to the Gulf of Mexico to await developments.⁶

During the year 1825, the first year of the new Adams-Clay administration, there were many occasions for allusions to and interpretations of the principles enunciated by the preceding administration. The large share which Adams had had in shaping the declaration of those principles make these early interpretations particularly significant.

Some two months before the beginning of the new administration, the chargé from Brazil (which country's *de facto* independence had not yet been recognized by Portugal, the mother country), endeavored to induce the State Department to put the supposed pledge into more tangible form. He proposed "that the United States should enter into an alliance with Brazil to maintain its independence, if Portugal

⁴Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 341.

⁵Burgess, *The Middle Period*, 146.

⁶Torrens to Secretario de Relaciones, 6 de diciembre de 1823, *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 67.

should be assisted by any foreign Power to reëstablish her former sway." About a month after the new administration had begun, the Brazilian chargé renewed his proposal. "Mr. Clay replied that, while the President adhered to the principles set forth in the message of his predecessor of December 2, 1823, the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil" seemed to make such an alliance unnecessary; "but that, if there should be a renewal of demonstrations on the part of the European allies against the independence of American States, the President would give to that condition of things every consideration which its importance would undoubtedly demand."⁷

While this did not promise anything definite, yet it could be legitimately interpreted to mean that in certain contingencies the executive department would be disposed, so far as it was able, to assist the new states in maintaining their independence.

Three weeks after taking charge of the State Department, Clay wrote the instructions for Poinsett, who was to set out a few days later as minister to Mexico. He said, "You will bring to the notice of the Mexican Government the message of the late President of the United States to their Congress of the 2d of December, 1823, asserting certain important principles of international law in the relations of Europe and America." He repeated briefly the non-colonization principle and added:

There is no disposition to disturb the colonial possessions, as they may now exist, of any of the European Powers, but it is against the establishment of new European colonies upon this continent that the principle is directed. The other principle asserted in the message is, that, whilst we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied Powers, we would regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere.
* * * Both principles were laid down after much anxious deliberation on the part of the late administration. The President, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both; and you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions.⁸

In these instructions to Poinsett, Clay defined the policy of his gov-

⁷Moore, *International Law Digest*, VI, 437.

⁸American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 579.

ernment with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico, the only Spanish possessions in America which remained loyal. There was a suspicion that France was negotiating for the cession of them in return for French support of Spanish absolutism. There was a possibility that they would be given to England to purchase that government's assistance in again freeing Spain from French domination. There was a probability that the islands would follow the example of the continental possessions and try to free themselves from Spain. There was a certainty that Mexico and Colombia were planning to overthrow Spanish power in the islands. The nearness of Cuba to the United States made it impossible for this government to be indifferent spectators to any fate that might befall that island. Furthermore, there had long been a feeling on the part of statesmen in Washington that some day Cuba should, and probably would, become a possession of the United States.

In his correspondence with diplomatic agents of the United States in the various interested countries, Clay made many statements concerning Cuba which were based upon, or were outgrowths of, the principles enunciated by Monroe, and which call for consideration in connection with the "more or less allied doctrines" included in the subject under discussion.

In Clay's instructions to Poinsett, referred to above, he declared: "The United States have no desire to aggrandize themselves by the acquisition of Cuba. And yet if that island is to be made a dependency of any one of the American states, it is impossible not to allow that the law of its position proclaims that it should be attached to the United States." He thought if Spain would not make peace it was not unlikely that a combined effort would be made by Mexico and Colombia to seize the islands.

The United States could not see this without apprehensions. From the point of view of productions, he argued, those Powers could not want them; while to the United States from that standpoint they would be very desirable. If they should pass under the domination of any European Power except Spain, the United States would have just cause for alarm. It would probably be best for all parties if Cuba were independent, provided she could maintain her independence. The United States, he continued, "are not disposed themselves to interfere with its present actual state; but they could not see with indifference any change that may be attempted in it." Poinsett was authorized to disclose frankly the feelings and interests of the United States if it

should become necessary. He was to use every endeavor to learn the purpose of Mexico, and to keep a vigilant eye on every movement toward Cuba.⁹

In two respects this was a distinct advance beyond the declarations of Monroe. In the first place, it meant that the United States would not only be alarmed at the establishment of new European colonies in America; but at the transfer of an existing colony from one European Power to another. In the second place, it meant that the United States would oppose the transfer of Cuba not only to a European Power but also to any American Power.

Having taken this step to reveal to Mexico his policy, Clay next disclosed it to the parent country, endeavoring to use it to induce Spain to terminate the hopeless struggle and recognize the new American states. Everett, the new minister to Spain, was instructed, on April 27, 1825, to approach that court in the most conciliatory manner possible; but to express the feeling of the United States that the cause of Spain in her former continental possessions in America was irretrievably lost, and that there was danger of her losing what she still feebly held in the Antilles if the war should continue. Clay declared that the armies of the new states no longer had employment on the Continent, but could not be disbanded so long as peace was not made.

And from the proximity and great value of Cuba and Porto Rico is it not to be anticipated that they will aim, and aim a successful blow, too, at those Spanish islands? Whilst they could operate from without, means would doubtless be [employed] at the same time to stimulate the population within to revolt. And that the disposition exists among the inhabitants, to a considerable extent, to throw off the Spanish authority, is well known. It is due to the United States to declare that they have constantly declined to give any countenance to that disposition * * *. If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands should become the object and the theatre of it their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations,

⁹Clay to Poinsett, March 26, 1825, MS. Department of State, Instructions, X, 225. This portion of Poinsett's instructions is not printed in the extracts in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 908, nor in House Ex. Doc. No. 42, 25th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5.

the performance of which, however painful it should be, they would not be at liberty to decline.

If Mexico and Colombia should seize them their navies, he argued, were not strong enough to hold them. The people of the islands were incapable of maintaining self-government. The result, should this country not interfere, would probably be that they would fall into the hands of some European Power friendly to Spain.

As the views and policy of the United States in regard to those islands may possibly have some influence, you are authorized frankly and fully to disclose them. The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those islands, in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open to our commerce as they are now open. This government desires no change of that condition.

It was not for the sake of the new republics that the President wished to see the war terminated, since it would probably be to their interest to have it continue, but, he told Everett, for the sake of Spain, for the cause of humanity, and for the repose of the world.¹⁰

Clay was not satisfied with direct efforts alone to induce Mexico and Colombia to keep hands off Cuba, and to convince Spain that she ought to make peace to save Cuba. He endeavored to bring indirect pressure to bear upon the court of Madrid through those European Powers which were supposed to exert a powerful influence on Spanish policy. He began with that Power whose influence had for more than a decade been dominant in the councils of the reactionary states. On May 10, 1825, Henry Middleton, the minister to Russia, was given instructions for the purpose which he was authorized to communicate to the court at St. Petersburg. They spoke in complimentary terms of Russia's influence on world affairs, of her disinterested position in the existing conflict between Spain and her former possessions, and of the Emperor's great influence at Madrid; and asked him to employ that influence in a pacific mediation between Spain and the new American states. The philanthropic Clay appealed through his minister to the humanitarian instincts of the great Alexander. He was reminded of the great length of the conflict; of its inevitableness sooner or later had it not occurred when it did; of the fact that there was absolutely

¹⁰Clay to Everett, April 27, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 302; extracts in Am. St. P., For., V, 866; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 430; Chadwick, U. S. and Sp., Dipl., 206.

no hope that Spain would ever be able to recover control on the continent; and of the further fact that she was in imminent danger of losing her remaining possessions in the Antilles. It would be well worth while for Spain to sacrifice her pride and make peace in order to save these valuable islands. He was also reminded of the great international importance of and interest in Cuba, and was told that,

If peace should be longer deferred, and the war should take the probable direction which has been supposed, during its further progress other Powers not now parties may be collaterally drawn into it. From much less considerable causes the peace of the world has been often disturbed. From the vicinity of Cuba to the United States, its valuable commerce, and the nature of its population, their government can not be indifferent to any political change to which that island may be destined. Great Britain and France also have deep interests in its fortunes, which must keep them wide awake to all those changes. In short, what European State has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be it what it may, of the most valuable of the West India islands? The reflections and the experience of the Emperor on the vicissitudes of war must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges by every precaution which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of states.

Such is the view of the war between Spain and the new republics which the President desires you most earnestly, but respectfully, to present to his Imperial Majesty. From this view it is evident that it is not so much for the new states themselves as for Spain that peace has become absolutely necessary. Their independence of her, whatever intestine divisions may, if intestine divisions shall, yet unhappily await them, is fixed and irrevocable. She may, indeed, by a blind and fatal protraction of the war, yet lose more: gain for her, is impossible. In becoming the advocate for peace, one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests, there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose, without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of those islands, now open to the commerce and enterprise of their citizens. They desire for themselves no political change in them. If Cuba

were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population render it improbable that it could maintain its independence.

Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring island was the afflicting theater. There could be no effectual preventive of those scenes, but in the guaranty, and in a large resident force of foreign Powers. The terms of such guaranty, and the quotas which each should contribute of such force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment, to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation. In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very foreign Powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European Power. And if the new republics, or either of them, were to conquer them, their maritime force as it now is, or for a long time to come is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. Nor is it believed that the new states desire, or will attempt, the acquisition, unless they shall be compelled in their own defence, to make it, by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Acting on the policy which is here unfolded, the Government of the United States, although they would have been justified to have seized Cuba and Porto Rico, in the just protection of the lives and the commerce of their citizens, which have been a prey to infamous pirates finding succor and refuge in Spanish territory, have signally displayed their patience and moderation by a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of Spain, who was herself bound, but has utterly failed, to repress those enormities.

Finally, the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of an useless waste of human life.

This celebrated despatch contained more than three thousand words. Middleton was authorized to communicate it all at once or a little at a time as his judgment should dictate.¹¹

¹¹Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 331; MS. Rel. Ext.; Am. St. P., For., V, 846; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 403.

The careful editor of the very interesting *Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825*, incorrectly states that this despatch is not in the American State Papers. See Am. Hist. Rev., XVIII, 561. "To guard against any accident which might befall the original," a copy of this instruction of May 10 was mailed by separate conveyance a little more than a fortnight later. See Brent to Middleton, May 26, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 665.

The sentiments of the Russian Government were not unknown to Clay and Adams. Many communications had passed between the two governments during the years immediately preceding.¹² The Russian minister, to whom Middleton's instructions were shown a few days after they were written, "spoke in terms of high commendation of this measure, and said without being able to anticipate what the Emperor's determination upon it may be, he is quite sure that it will be received and treated by him with great consideration, and as an act equally marked by moderation, candor, and friendly feeling towards him on the part of the United States. He said he was very desirous that there should be time for this measure to have its full effect," and asked Adams' consent for him to communicate it to the Russian ambassadors at Paris and London, hoping through them to exert some friendly influence at Madrid earlier than could be done through St. Petersburg to dissuade Spain from doing anything further to precipitate the apprehended attack by Mexico and Colombia. Adams consented, and conversed at length with the Baron on the occasion for, the character of, and the motives for the proposed mediation.¹³ In his conversation with Adams, Baron Tuyl seems to have gotten a more definite notion than Middleton's instructions gave of how far the interests of the United States might in certain contingencies carry them. At least Nesselrode understood Tuyl to report that Adams had

¹²See Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, 191-222, *passim*; and Cor. of Rus. Min. in Washington, 1818-1825, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIII, 309-345, 537-562. On Nov. 9/21, 1818, *ibid.*, 317, Nesselrode wrote from Aix-la-Chapelle to Poletica in Washington: "Si donc, à votre arrivée à Washington, le Gouvernement Américain n'a point encore résolu la reconnaissance des Colonies Espagnoles insurgées, il Vous est très-expressément recommandé de chercher à dissuader le Cabinet de Washington de cet acte d'hostilité envers l'Espagne."

On July 13/25, 1822, *ibid.*, 342, Nesselrode wrote Baron Tuyl in Washington: "Si la connaissance du désir qu'aurait l'Empereur de voir cet état de paix se prolonger, pouvoit porter le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis à ne modifier en rien les dispositions qu'il a manifestées envers l'Espagne et à ne pas s'armer contre el dans le lutte que soutiennent ses provinces d'Outre-mer, vous n'hésiteriez point à exprimer les vœux de Sa Majesté Impériale."

On Dec. 2/14, 1822, *ibid.*, 540, Nesselrode again wrote Tuyl: "Nous ne prétendons pas arrêter la marche de l'avenir; l'affranchissement de l'Amérique Méridionale est probable, il est immanent peut-être, mais, je le répète, c'était une raison de plus aux vœux de l'Empereur, pour souhaiter que Son Ministre engageât le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à suivre un système inoffensif à l'égard de l'Espagne." These communications show a desire to maintain peace, although in other respects they differ radically from the position of the United States. It is safe to assume that their spirit, at least, was made known to the Government at Washington.

¹³Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 8-10.

declared that if Cuba and Porto Rico were to become the possession of any American Power the United States might find it necessary to insist on being that Power.¹⁴ This is however no more than the despatch to Middleton darkly hints at. The instructions to Everett at Madrid contain a stronger hint at such a feeling; and those to Poinsett at Mexico openly suggest it.

On the day after he had written Middleton's instructions, Clay told Rufus King, who was just ready to set out on his second mission to the court of St. James, that the coincidence in the policy of the United States and England with reference to the war between Spain and the new states required frankness in our intercourse with that court. In this spirit he was to make known the desire of the President to see the war honorably terminated. He was told of the above instructions to Poinsett, Everett, and Middleton, and a copy of the last was enclosed. In concluding the brief note Clay said:

If Great Britain, and the other principal European Powers, would heartily unite with the United States in these pacific endeavors, the President entertains the confident hope that a stop would be put to the further and unnecessary effusion of human blood.¹⁵

Two days later James Brown, the minister to the French court, was told that Poinsett and the other ministers to the new states had been instructed to use their best efforts to bring about peace between Spain and those states. "But it is in Europe more than in America that our efforts must be directed. And the strong ground to take is that peace is more necessary to Spain than to the new republics." He was told that Everett was to endeavor to convince Spain of such necessity; Middleton was to enlist the sympathy and good offices of Russia; and King had similar instructions with reference to Great Britain. A copy of Middleton's instructions was enclosed, and Brown was requested to open the matter with the French Government. In concluding this despatch, which was also brief, Clay said:

¹⁴Nesselrode to Tuyl, le 4 Septembre 1825, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVIII, 562.

¹⁵Clay to King, May 11, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 345.

Baron Tuyl's communications to the Russian ambassadors at London and Paris concerning the mediation were, at Adams request, carried by King in order that the matter might first reach the English court through the American minister. Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 10.

By a concerted system of action, direct and collateral on Spain, it is hoped that she may be made to see the necessity of peace. And great confidence would be placed in this hope, if Russia and France, the Powers most likely to influence the councils of Spain, would lend their hearty coöperation.¹⁶

As a part of the concerted action being brought to bear on Spain, Clay mentioned in this letter to Brown the fact that "Information has reached us that the local authorities of Cuba have petitioned the King of Spain to acknowledge the new republics and close the war." The Mexican minister in Washington told his government the same on May 8. He said the *ayuntamiento* of Havana had some time before petitioned the Madrid Government for reinforcements to enable them to hold the island; but now fears having increased, that body had petitioned the parent government to recognize the independence of the continental states as the only means of saving the island. In explanation of the reason for these increasing fears, Obregon said the spirit of independence was increasing in the island because of the good order which they saw established in those continental states and the disorderly condition of affairs which the blunders of the Spanish Government allowed to prevail in the island.¹⁷

Before Clay's efforts at combined mediation had time to produce any results, a series of events occurred in the West Indies which caused him considerable anxiety and threw Mexico into a fever of excitement. These were connected with certain mysterious movements of French naval vessels which strengthened suspicions already existing of French intentions on Cuba. Since the beginning of the year, reports had been coming from various sources that Spain was gathering reinforcements in the ports of the peninsula to send to Havana for protecting and preserving order in the islands and operating from there against Mexico, Central America, and Colombia.¹⁸

¹⁶Clay to James Brown, May 13, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 356.

¹⁷Obregon to Secretario, 8 de Mayo de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext.

¹⁸The Mexican minister in Washington wrote his government February 2 that reports had reached him of two ships fitting out in Ferrol. Six days later he enclosed a clipping from the *Washington Gazette* saying a frigate, three sloops of war, and several transports had already reached Havana from Spain, and others were coming, to make an attack from there on Vera Cruz. On March 30 he told of the arrival of new reinforcements in Cuba. In this letter he said he had offered rewards to Cuban exiles whom he was in touch with to induce them to burn the Spanish ships that had recently come. On July 11 he reported three thousand men on their way from Coruña to reinforce the garrison

The fact that reinforcements were coming, though learned with regret and fear, occasioned no surprise. But when certain transports reached Havana they were accompanied by a French war vessel. This was disquieting. Alaman, the foreign minister in Mexico, reported the fact to Rocafuerte, the chargé in London, saying the transports had apparently come from the Canary islands without naval convoy, trusting in the protection of French ships to get to their destination. This was regarded as a violation of neutrality, since the troops were evidently directed against Mexico and Colombia. It looked to him like another bit of double dealing and bad faith similar to placing the cordon of French sanitary police along the Pyrenees before the invasion of Spain in 1823. Rocafuerte was asked to bring the matter to the attention of the English Government and ask that cabinet to solicit an explanation from France.¹⁹ Obregon, writing from Washington of the matter, said all that was certainly known was that the French vessel had pursued the same course at the same time and entered the harbor of Havana with the Spanish transports. In acknowledging and commenting on this, the despatch from the Mexican foreign office said there must have been a design in the meeting; and Obregon was asked to bring the matter to the attention of the United States Government.²⁰

This French interference in the West Indies in 1825 furnished the occasion for the first actual application of the Monroe Doctrine.

Before any explanation of the above had been made, another French movement in West Indian waters roused new and more serious suspicions. A Mexican agent in Jamaica reported to his government late in July that a French fleet of twenty-eight vessels had suddenly ap-

of San Juan de Ulúa in Vera Cruz harbor, the only remaining Spanish post in Mexico. Obregon to Secretario, 2 de Febrero, 8 de Febrero, 30 de Marzo, 11 de Junio de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext.

Michelena reported from London that, in a conference of May 21, Canning had told him that the troops being collected at Coruña ostensibly for Peru were really going to Havana; and Michelena had replied that opinion in the island was becoming unfavorable to the Peninsula because of the unwise measures of the Madrid Government. Rocafuerte wrote on July 9 that merchants of Cadiz and Havana had agreed to stand the cost of an expedition of 12,000 men against Panama or Mexico. One vessel had left Cadiz and three more were about ready to sail. Michelena to Secretario, 21 de Marzo de 1825; Rocafuerte to Secretario, 9 de Julio de 1825; MS. Rel. Ext.

¹⁹Alaman to Rocafuerte, 1 de Junio de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext.

²⁰Obregon to Secretario, 2 de Julio de 1825, and reply, 7 de Septiembre de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext.

peared in Martinique, and its movements were mysterious. A French ship had just brought to Santiago de Cuba the new Spanish governor. Some of the French ships had been seen off the island of Santo Domingo moving in the direction of Havana. He enclosed a clipping from a Jamaica paper saying that French troops had disembarked in Cuba.²¹

This startling news reached Mexico August 15, 1825. The next day Alaman hastened to show the correspondence to Ward, the British chargé, and from him to Poinsett. Ward and Poinsett conferred regarding the matter, and the former talked with President Victoria. As a probable motive, Poinsett suggested to Alaman that possibly Spain had decided to cede the island to France rather than have it wrested from her through an independence movement encouraged from Mexico. To confirm his suspicion he alluded to the fact that a Cuban, who had visited Santa Anna in Yucatan some months earlier and had represented himself to be an agent of the Cuban patriots and suggested to Santa Anna the invasion of Cuba, for which the latter immediately began preparation, was now back in Cuba and in favor with the Spanish authorities. Poinsett told Alaman this might have been but a ruse to discover the intentions of Mexico, which, thus discovered, would doubtless be considered such "as would justify any measures Spain and France might think proper to take for its preservation."

In the hurried conferences mentioned above, it was arranged that identical notes should be presented to Ward and Poinsett with reference to the matter. The notes declared that the President of Mexico saw in these movements of French war vessels an act hostile to the independent states of America; they referred to the declaration of President Monroe against the interference of any third Power in the conflict between Spain and her former dominions; argued that this conduct of France was certainly such interference; and asked that each bring the matter to the attention of his government in order that his government might demand of France such explanations as the case required. Poinsett objected to the language of the note in one particular, as the note was originally drawn, because, he said, it

²¹Basadre to [Secretario] Kingston, 24 de Julio de 1825, 27 de Julio de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext. See note 17, above.

Callahan, *Cuba and Int. Rel.*, 142, discusses briefly the appearance of the French fleet in the West Indies.

implied that the declaration of Monroe gave Mexico the right to demand that the United States should interfere on behalf of the new states. It was modified so as to remove the implication and the change was also indicated to Ward. Alaman had shown some hesitancy in making the notes to the Governments of England and the United States identical. Ward and Poinsett appealed to President Victoria and were assured that the notes should be identical. He "expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of Mr. Alaman and declared that he himself was ignorant of the arrival of this important intelligence until he saw it published in the *Sol*. Such conduct on the part of the Secretary is inexplicable and almost incredible."²²

The newspaper which had published the correspondence was owned, and presumably also edited, by Alaman. An editorial of the same day on which the correspondence was published, also the same on which the hurried conferences occurred, had declared: "In our opinion this movement can have no other object than to cover the island of Cuba from the designs of the United States and from those attributed to Colombia and Mexico." On the same day Poinsett addressed a spirited note to Alaman protesting that in the editorial the designs of Colombia and Mexico were represented as hypothetical, while those of the United States are represented as positive. Poinsett declared the United States never did entertain such designs and had disavowed all such; and asked Alaman to use his influence with the editor to have the mistaken impression corrected. Alaman's reply, also of the same day, promised, if possible, to have an article inserted in the next day's issue correcting public opinion on the matter.²³

The alarm caused by these French movements in the West Indies proved happily to be a false one. When the explanations called for by England and the United States at Mexico's request were made, it was affirmed that the French cruiser's convoying the Spanish transports from Martinique to Havana had been solely on the order and responsibility of the French commander at Martinique; and had been

²²Poinsett to Clay, Aug. 17, 1825, and enclosures, Alaman to Poinsett, Aug. 16, 1825, and Poinsett to Alaman, Aug. 17, 1825; MSS. Dept. of St., Desp., II; Am. St. P., For., VI, 364; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 995. And see also Poinsett to Clay, Aug. 21, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Mex. Desp., I; extracts in Am. St. P., For., V, 909; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 488.

²³Poinsett to Alaman, Aug. 16, 1825, Alaman to Poinsett, Aug. 16, 1825, Poinsett to Clay, Aug. 17, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Mex., Duplicates of Poinsett's Despatches.

disavowed by the government and prohibited for the future.²⁴ Canning, in writing to the British representative at Paris, said he hoped this explanation, which Villèle and Damas, had given was true; "But," he continued, "I confess I have my doubts, whether it was not (prescribed I will not say) a permitted experiment, to see how far a French force might be incidentally and imperceptibly slipped into Havana. Villèle ought to know that our eyes are open to the possibility of such a maneuver. He ought to know, too, that we would not put up with it."²⁵

The large French fleet whose movements had occasioned by far the greater alarm had gone to the West Indies ostensibly, at least, to attend and solemnize the ceremonies connected with French recognition of the independence of Hayti. After performing that ceremony it had touched at Havana, then visited Norfolk, and sailed from there late in August, part of it returning to France and the rest to the naval station at Martinique.²⁶ The Spanish Government declared to Nelson, the retiring United States minister at Madrid, that "His Majesty has at no time thought of conceding to any Power the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and, so far from such a purpose, is firmly determined to keep them under the dominion and authority of his legitimate sovereignty."²⁷ After the uncertainty concerning the French operations had been cleared up and the excitement had passed, Clay declared to the French Government through Brown, the Minister at Paris:

²⁴Rocafuerte to Secretario, 9 de Agosto de 1825, saying Canning had promised to question France but no explanation had yet been given him; Obregon to Secretario, 18 de Septiembre de 1825, enclosing Rocafuerte to Obregon, 12 de Agosto de 1825, telling what the French Government had declared to the English; all in MSS. Rel. Ext.

²⁵Canning to Granville, June 21, 1825, Stapleton, Of. Cor. of Canning, I, 376. This shows that the explanation had been asked and given long before the Mexican Government's note of June 1, requesting such, could have been received. Before the French movement had occurred Canning had said: "I have some reason to believe that Polignac is instructed, or is disposed without instructions (I would not undertake to say which) to hint at the possibility of the occupation of the Havannah by France. That will never do." *Ibid.*, 265.

²⁶Obregon to Secretario, 18 de Septiembre de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext. The Address of President Boyer of July 11, 1825, accepting the Ordinance of the King of France recognizing independence, is in Br. and For. St. P. XIII, 999. Temperley, *Later Am. Policy of Canning*, Am. Hist. Rev., XI, 791, says the French fleet "came ostensibly to collect a debt from Hayte."

²⁷Clay to Poinsett, Sept. 24, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X; extracts from this letter not including this portion are in Am. St. P., For., VI, 581; and House Ex. Doc. No. 42, 25th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7.

The President conceives it due to the friendly relations which happily subsist between the two nations, and to the frankness by which he wishes all their intercourse to be characterized, that the purpose of any similar movement hereafter, made in a season of peace should be communicated to this government. * * * The President can not suppose a state of things in which either of the great maritime Powers of Europe, with or without the consent of Spain, would feel itself justified to occupy, or attempt the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico without the concurrence or at least the knowledge of the United States.²⁸

In carrying out these instructions Brown declared, as he was authorized to do, that the United States "could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European Power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." The French minister admitted that the United States had a right to be informed of the reason for such a movement as that of the French fleet and said it was "a departure from the rule, but that, in future, the United States should be duly apprised of the objects of every such squadron sent into their vicinity."²⁹

In the same letter in which Canning expressed his suspicions of the French explanation of the matter of the French convoy of Spanish troop ships, he stated positively England's policy with reference to Cuba, which was practically the same as that of the United States, namely:

As to Cuba, you can not too soon, nor too amicably, of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume,) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother country. Next to that I wish it independent, either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what can not or must not be, is that any great

²⁸Clay to James Brown, Oct. 25, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 404; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 424.

It caused the administration some embarrassment in its relations with Congress, and Clay tried to explain away objections raised. See McMaster, U. S., V, 53, 54; and Clay to Poinsett Nov. 9, 1825, Am. St. P., For., V, 854, or *ibid.*, VI, 582, and Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 423; also Message of President to House, March 30, 1826, Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 483-489, and Poinsett to Clay, May 6, 1826, *ibid.*, 998.

In December this communication to Brown was shown to the Mexican minister. Obregon to Secretario, 15 de Diciembre de 1825, MS. Rel. Ext.

²⁹Brown to Damas, Jan. 2, 1826, Am. St. P., For., V, 882; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 444. Brown to Clay, Jan. 10, 1826, Am. St. P., For., V, 881; Br. and For. St. P., XIII, 445.

maritime Power should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.³⁰

Canning assumed a cynical and suspicious attitude toward Clay's effort at combined mediation between Spain and her former possessions. After an interview on the subject, he said he found King, the United States minister,

relying with a simpleness which appeared quite childish on the good sense of the continental Powers, for the advice which they would give to Spain, and on the awakened good sense of Spain for listening to that advice when given. I set him right upon these points: on which if his government blunder as sincerely as he appears to do, there is perhaps no harm done beyond the loss of time, but if—as the suspicion sometimes comes across me—this *bonhomie* is affected by the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] for the express purpose of being enabled to cry out and take a new line on the disappointment of their groundless expectations, why then the Yankees may be just the rogues that we have always hitherto taken them to be, but which I was willing to hope they might have resolved to be no longer.³¹

Fully persuaded that Clay's plan would fail, as a counter-proposition he proposed that Great Britain, France, and the United States, should unite in disclaiming any intentions on the islands, thus calming the fears of Spain and preparing her for receiving peace proposals. But as Adams had evaded the issue two years earlier when Canning tried to get the United States Government to commit itself against the annexation of any former Spanish possessions, so Clay evaded it now. He replied through King that Canning's proposal was likely to defeat its avowed purpose and encourage Spain to continue the war, since it would relieve her of the fear of seizure by any of these three Powers. A few days later, after he had learned that France had refused to accede to Canning's proposal, Clay sent through King a copy of the letter of October 25 to Brown at Paris warning the French Govern-

³⁰Canning to Granville, June 21, 1825, Stapleton, *Of. Cor. of Canning*, I, 276. See also Stapleton, *A. G., Life of Canning*, III, 142-150; and Temperley, *Later Am. Policy of Canning*, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 790, which says Canning feared the United States more than France. Temperley, *Life of Canning*, 188, says England's recognition of the Spanish American states "restrained the pretensions of the Yankees, and preserved Cuba to Spain."

³¹Canning to Liverpool, Aug. 6, 1825, Stapleton, *Of. Cor. of Canning*, I, 285.

ment that the United States "could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European Power than Spain"; and said if Great Britain should direct her ambassador at Paris to protest in like manner nothing more would be necessary. In this letter to King, Clay said he felt no apprehension that Great Britain would entertain "views of aggrandizement in regard to Cuba, which could not fail to lead to a rupture with the United States."³²

Shortly after the appearance of the French danger in the West Indies, while discussing the terms of a prospective commercial treaty in Mexico, Poinsett

observed that the States which formerly were Spanish possessions had given very sufficient proofs that they required no assistance to enable them to repel the attacks of Spain; and that the United States had pledged themselves not to permit any European Power to interfere either with their form of government or with their independence; and as in the event of such an attempt being made by them, the United States would be compelled to take the most active and efficient part in the contest, it was not just that they should be placed by the treaty on a less favorable footing than the other republics, whose existence they were disposed to support at such hazards.³³

When this statement of Poinsett's became known to the Congress at Washington, it caused severe criticism and called for an explanation.

In a report of Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, March 29, 1826, addressed to the President, and by him sent to Congress, it is stated that the United States have contracted no engagement, nor made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, or to either of them, that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign Powers, with the independence or form of government of those nations: nor have any instructions been issued, authorizing any such engagement or pledge!

The apprehended danger had passed, he continued,

³²Clay to King, Oct. 17, 1825, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., X, 394; same to same, Oct. 26, 1825, *ibid.*, 405.

For Canning's proposal see also Callahan, *Cuba and Int. Rel.*, 147-151. On page 52 this writer says Canning, on receipt of Clay's suggestion that England should declare to France her unwillingness to see Cuba pass to any European Power other than Spain, declared he had already stated to France practically the same thing, the previous July, and so there was no reason for repeating it at some one else's suggestion.

³³Am. St. P., For., VI, 589.

but if, indeed, an attempt by force had been made by allied Europe to subvert the liberties of the southern nations on this continent, and to erect, upon the ruins of their free institutions, monarchical systems, the people of the United States would have stood pledged, in the opinion of their Executive, not to any foreign state, but to themselves and to their posterity, by their dearest interests, and highest duties, to resist to the utmost such attempt; and it is to a pledge of that character that Mr. Poinsett alone refers.³⁴

In a later conference with the Mexican negotiators concerning the treaty, after Poinsett had learned of the Congressional criticism which his statement had occasioned, he said, "that it was well known to the Mexican plenipotentiaries no other pledge had ever been given than what was contained in the message of President Monroe, and which he believed, the people of the United States would have redeemed. But from the similarity of our institutions no Mexican could be ignorant that such a declaration on the part of the President of the United States was not binding on the nation without the sanction of Congress." Esteva, one of the plenipotentiaries, replied that he had so understood it.³⁵

Mexican disappointment at Clay's explanatory interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was voiced by President Victoria in an address to the Mexican Congress on May 23, 1826. He declared:

An official document, which has very recently been published, has thrown considerable light upon the policy of the cabinet at Washington, with regard to the struggle in which a large portion of America is involved. The memorable promise of the President Monroe, contained in his message of the 2nd of December, 1823, is disclaimed by the present Government of the United States. * * * It is, indeed, true that Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, and author of the note, appeals to the sympathy of the people of the United States, and to their community of interests with the new republics, but it is no less true, that we have no longer any sort of guarantee or promise on the part of that government, to take any part in the contest, if a third Power should become an auxiliary of Spain.³⁶

³⁴Moore, Int. Law Digest., VI, 408.

³⁵Am. St. P., For., VI, 592.

³⁶Br. & For. St. P., XIII, 1082.

When Poinsett's statement concerning the "pledge" of the United States was made known, Congress had already begun to criticize the administration's attitude toward the new states. The occasion was the well known proposal to send representatives to the Congress at Panama.

In his special message to Congress of December 26, 1825, touching the Panama Congress, President Adams suggested, as one of the subjects that might be discussed, "an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders." He added, that the principle had been "more than two years since announced by my predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations that they will all feel it is an essential appendage to their independence."³⁷

In a second special message on the subject, on March 15, 1826, Adams stated that "should it be deemed advisable to contract any conventional engagement on this topic, our views would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of the parties to the compact to maintain the principles in application to its own territory." Speaking of the intentions of the Congress to consider the question of Cuba and Porto Rico, he declared "the danger therefrom resulting of their falling ultimately into the hands of some European Power other than Spain, will not admit of our looking at the consequences to which the Congress at Panama may lead with indifference."³⁸

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported against having representatives at Panama for fear it might compromise the neutrality of the United States and involve them in entangling alliances. The Senate debated the matter in secret session for nearly a month. During this debate, on March 27, 1826, Webster, in the House of Representatives, interpreted the Monroe declaration to mean,

that this government could not look with indifference on any combination among other Powers to assist Spain in her war against the South American states; that we could not but consider any

³⁷Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, VI, 416; Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 347; Edington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 155.

³⁸Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, VI, 417; Henderson, *Am. Dipl. Questions*, 350.

such combination as dangerous or unfriendly to us; and that if it should be formed it would be for the competent authorities of this government to decide, when the case arose, what course our duty and our interest should require us to pursue.³⁹

On April 14, 1826, Webster resented the suggestion that the message was "a loose and vague declaration." He said it was carefully considered and "the message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us." It meant much and effected much good, and "it can not now be taken back, retracted or annulled without disgrace."

It did not commit the United States to take up arms on every indication of hostile feeling of the European Powers toward the new states. Even if they furnished aid against the most distant, such as Chile and Buenos Aires, it "might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if any army, equipped and maintained by these Powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference by us."⁴⁰

In this same debate, James K. Polk, member from Tennessee, declared: "When the message of the late President of the United States was communicated to Congress in 1823, it was viewed, as it should have been, as the mere expression of opinion of the Executive, submitted to the consideration and deliberation of Congress."⁴¹

Buchanan introduced a resolution into Congress on April 18, 1826, declaring:

It is, therefore, the opinion of this House, that the Government of the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic character, nor ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate respecting such an alliance, with all or any of the Spanish American republics; nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European Powers with their independence

³⁹Moore, Int. Law Digest, VI, 405.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, VI, 406.

⁴¹Henderson, Am. Dipl. Questions, 358.

or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization on the continent of America; but that the people of the United States be left free to act in any crisis, in such a manner as their feelings of friendship towards these republics, and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate.⁴²

In spite of the opposition, the friends of the administration and those who favored the mission won by a close vote. In the instructions which Clay gave to the agents who were to start for Panama, he said "that it was not intended to commit the parties, who might concur in any joint declaration against future colonization, 'to the support of the particular boundaries which may be claimed by any one of them; nor is it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against any future attempt to plant a new European colony.'"⁴³

In 1827 a new danger threatened Cuba and gave Adams and Clay considerable anxiety for a time. There was a probability that England and Spain would be involved in war over their conflicting policies and interests in Portugal. On October 6, 1826, Canning wrote Liverpool:

One single word I must add in the deepest secrecy. God forbid war; but if Spain will have it, ought not we to think of the Havannah? Where else can we strike a blow? and what other blow would be so effectual? It would settle all better than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.⁴⁴

Gallatin, then in London, was approached by the Mexican minister, it seems, with a suggestion to make Cuba independent under the joint guaranty of Great Britain and all of the American states. It is said that Gallatin favored the plan and recommended it to Clay; and that he also approached Canning on the matter, but found him noncommittal.⁴⁵ In spite of Canning's secrecy, his plans became known. On August 17, 1827, Everett in Madrid wrote Clay that England was planning to effect a revolution in the Canary Islands and Cuba in order "to establish the British influence in these islands [and] in the end, probably, to obtain territorial possession of them." The sources of infor-

⁴²Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, VI, 420.

⁴³*Ibid.*, VI, 416.

⁴⁴Canning to Liverpool, Oct. 6, 1826, in Stapleton, *Of. Cor. of Canning*, II, 144.

⁴⁵Callahan, *Cuba and Int. Rel.*, 157.

mation were such, Everett thought, as to leave no doubt of the facts.⁴⁶ Everett took advantage of the first good opportunity that presented itself to declare to the Spanish Government, "it is impossible for them [the United States] to view with indifference these movements of the British Government, considering it, as they do, as a settled principle that the island of Cuba must in no event, and under no pretext, pass into the possession of, or under the protection of, any European Power other than Spain."⁴⁷ Adams and Clay thought this danger, together with that which was threatening from Mexico and Colombia, justified them in sending a secret agent to Havana to report confidentially on the sentiment in the islands toward the various nations concerned. Besides repeating the instructions which he had written for a secret agent late in 1825, Clay asked this agent to learn what the attitude of the inhabitants would be toward a colonial connection with Great Britain, in case the existing relations of that power and Spain should result in war and England should attack Havana; and he was also to learn the Spanish means for resisting such attack.⁴⁸

During the last year of the Adams-Clay administration, anxiety concerning Cuba was not entirely relieved; but no important diplomatic communications passed. The Jackson administration continued practically unchanged the policy of their predecessors. In October of 1829 Van Buren told Van Ness, the new minister to Madrid,

as it is not impossible that Spain, in her present embarrassed and dependent situation, might be induced to yield her assent to a

⁴⁶Everett to Clay, Aug. 17, 1827, House Ex. Doc. No. 121, 32d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. As evidence, Everett enclosed a copy, which had been given him in the strictest confidence, of a despatch dated June 1 from the Spanish minister at London. That minister said the information had been given him by the Duke of Wellington. Everett said it was strange that the Duke should have revealed such; but thought it "was probably owing to the strong feeling of disgust and bitterness with which he has been inspired by the late change in the administration." See also Chadwick, *U. S. and Spain*, Dipl., 216.

⁴⁷Everett to Salmon, Dec. 10, 1827, enclosed with Everett to Clay, Dec. 12, 1827, House Ex. Doc. No. 121, 32d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 22, 21. See Chadwick, *U. S. and Sp.*, Dipl., 217.

⁴⁸Clay to Daniel P. Cook, March 12, 1827, MS. Dept. of St., Instr., XI, 267. This shows that Adams and Clay were aware of the English designs long before the information from Everett came. For the instructions to Robertson in 1825 see above, p. 32 and note 68. The former agent did not go; but Cook went, had several interviews with the Spanish governor, Vivés, and reported. This confidential mission was the subject for a Congressional investigation the next year, and occasioned considerable embarrassment for the administration. Adams, *Memoirs*, VIII, 20-21.

temporary occupation of it [Cuba], as a pledge for the fulfillment of her engagements, or to part with her right of property in it, or other considerations affording immediate relief in the hour of her distress, it is the wish of the President that the same watchfulness which had engaged the attention of your predecessors in relation to this subject should be continued during your administration of the affairs of the legation.

He was told that the United States could not enter into engagements to guarantee the possession of Cuba to Spain; but, alluding to the danger from Mexico and Colombia, "this government has every reason to believe that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands would again be found effectual on the recurrence of similar events."⁴⁹ In this same month of October Poinsett told of a new movement of the Mexican Government the purpose of which, he thought, was to incite a slave revolt in Cuba.⁵⁰ Six weeks later Van Buren instructed Butler, who was to replace Poinsett at Mexico, to remonstrate against the alleged intention of Mexico to excite the slave rebellion.⁵¹ Late in 1830 the minister at Madrid was told that Mexico had given "assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to." In this same letter he was told that the new states had given notice that if Spain persisted in her refusal to make peace and recognize them, they would find it necessary to attack the islands. In view of this he reaffirmed the position of Adams and Clay that the United States was content to have Cuba remain the possession of Spain; could not consent to its transfer to any European Power; and greatly preferred that it should not pass to either of the South American states; but "the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American states might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands," unless the slaves should be armed.⁵²

A little more than a year before the close of the Adams-Clay administration, conditions in the southern part of South America fur-

⁴⁹Van Buren to Van Ness, Oct. 2, 1829, House Ex. Doc. No. 121, 32d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 27, 28; Moore, *International Law Digest*, VI, 448.

⁵⁰Poinsett to Van Buren, Oct. 14, 1829, MS. Dept. of St., Mex., Desp., IV.

⁵¹Van Buren to Poinsett, Nov. 30, 1829, enclosing the despatch to Butler, MSS. Dept. of St., Instr., XIV.

⁵²Van Buren to Van Ness, Oct. 13, 1830, House Ex. Doc. No. 121, 32d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 28; Moore, *International Law Digest*, VI, 449.

nished an opportunity for Clay to restate and apply the Monroe declaration. When war was on between Argentina and Brazil in 1828, the former inquired the scope of the declaration of Monroe's message. Clay said even if Brazil and Portugal had remained united, the war would have been far from presenting the case which the message contemplated.

Concerning the binding character of it, Clay said:

The declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand. Should the case ever occur of such European interference as the message supposed, and it became necessary to decide whether the country would or would not engage in war, Congress alone would by the Constitution be competent to decide that question.⁵³

In 1835 prospective British aggression in Honduras furnished an occasion for Secretary Forsyth to state the attitude of the United States toward such a move. British settlers in Honduras were trying to extend their boundaries. It was understood that their agent, who had been sent to London to secure the desired extensions, had been directed by the British Government to proceed to Madrid to open negotiations with that Power for the desired extension. Forsyth said to Barry, the Minister at Madrid, "It is expected that you will keep an eye upon the movements of the agent above mentioned in Madrid, and that you will use all prudent means to prevent the conclusion of any arrangement on the subject."⁵⁴

In 1840, when the possibility was revived of a cession of Cuba to Great Britain, Forsyth went a step further than Clay or Van Buren had done and virtually pledged to Spain the military and naval support of the United States to prevent any Power from taking Cuba. Forsyth declared to Vail, then American minister at Madrid:

Should you have reason to suspect any design on the part of Spain to transfer voluntarily her title to the island, whether of ownership or possession and whether permanent or temporary, to Great Britain, or any other Power, you will distinctly state that the United States will prevent it, at all hazards, as they will any foreign military occupation for any pretext whatsoever; and you are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in

⁵³Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, VI, 434.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, VI, 442.

case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.⁵⁵

In 1843, Secretary Webster repeated to the consul at Havana the declaration of Forsyth.⁵⁶ In 1844, Secretary Upshur repeated practically the same statement to Minister Irving at Madrid.

The CHAIRMAN. The papers are of an historical character and perhaps are not so open to discussion as the later phases will be, when an expression of personal opinion as to policy rather than as to history is required. I am, however, at your service, if there be any desire—

Mr. WILLIAM HOYNES. I was about to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it would be well to proceed with the reading of the papers, and afterwards, if we find anything in them requiring discussion, we will then be ready to discuss them.

The CHAIRMAN. If that be the pleasure of the meeting, it is perfectly agreeable. I notice that Professor Wilson has come in, and I would like to ask him if he will not be good enough to take the chair.

Mr. GEORGE G. WILSON, a member of the Executive Council, thereupon took the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce as the next speaker Professor James M. Callahan, Professor and Head of the Department of History and Political Science, West Virginia University, who will speak upon the subject covering the period from 1845 to 1870.

STATEMENTS, INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND OF MORE OR LESS ALLIED DOCTRINES FROM 1845 TO 1870

ADDRESS OF JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN,

*Professor and Head of the Department of History and Political
Science, West Virginia University*

In the quarter century after 1845, the paramount interests of the United States and the future peace of the continent, contemplated in

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, VI, 450. Latané, *Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Spanish America*, 104.

⁵⁶Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, VI, 450; Latané, *Dipl. Rel. between the U. S. and Sp. Am.*, 104.

the principles of the Monroe Doctrine which Cass called the American doctrine of self-preservation, were threatened at many points and were a source of constant discussion and frequent action.

1. POLICY OF THE POLK ADMINISTRATION.

James Buchanan, who was Secretary of State from 1845 to 1849, after his term of service, said: "Throughout Mr. Polk's administration it was our steady policy to indoctrinate all the southern nations on this continent to avoid all political connection with European nations and to establish an American policy."¹

James K. Polk was elected to the presidency on a party policy to annex Texas, which his predecessor feared might otherwise be forced to seek refuge in the arms of some other Power, "either through a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, or the adoption of some other expedient which might virtually make her tributary to such Power, and dependent upon it for all time."² The paramount interests of the United States and the future peace of the continent, contemplated in the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, had recently been threatened at several points. There had been recent apprehensions of a possible occupation of the Isthmus of Panama by Great Britain under an arrangement with Spain.³ From the American representative in Venezuela, the American Government had recently received information of a proposed congress of Latin American states at Lima representing Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, New Granada, Mexico and Brazil, to sustain the dominant parties in those states and to oppose the advance of the United States on the American continent.⁴ Since 1841. the British had shown a disposition to extend Guiana and to emigrate to Venezuela, whose people later begun to fear British designs of annexation and even turned to the United States in hope of alliance.⁵ In 1844, Brazil invoked the intervention of England and France against Buenos Aires to protect the independence of Uruguay, which had been recognized by Brazil and Buenos Aires by a treaty concluded

¹Am. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1899, pp. 95-102. Buchanan to Burke, May 30, 1850.

²See 15 Instructions, France, No. 6, Aug. 26, 1844. Also, 12 Despatches, Mexico, Jan. 9, 1845.

³1 Despatches, Venezuela, No. 26, Feb. 13, 1837.

⁴2 Despatches, Venezuela, No. 20, Dec. 26, 1842.

⁵5 Despatches, Venezuela, No. 47 and No. 48, January, 1848.

through the mediation of England in 1828.⁶ This was followed in 1845 by an Anglo-French blockade of the coast of Buenos Aires.

New sources of possible future danger arose in the four years of the Polk administration. There was an anxious solicitude concerning the destiny of California, which Santa Anna had recently offered to cede to England, and in which many regarded the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine more necessary than in Cuba. In June, 1845, after the annexation of Texas, Guizot, at the head of the French ministry, proposed the doctrine of a "balance of power" on the American continent in order to preserve the American equilibrium. In 1846 disturbances at Panama, and the Flores expedition against Ecuador, threatened serious complications. In 1847, there were apprehensions of British seizure of Cuba and Porto Rico, and of a Spanish scheme through General Flores to create two new monarchies in the new world—one to include Cuba, Porto Rico and Santo Domingo, and the other the United States of Colombia.⁷ Near the close of 1847, Nicaragua in impassioned eloquence implored the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1848, at the close of the war with Mexico, conditions in Yucatan and along the Nicaragua isthmian transit route invited the interference and occupation of Great Britain; a territorial quarrel between Peru and Bolivia threatened new dangers of disorders in that quarter; and in Santo Domingo a protectorate was under contemplation by France who desired Samana Bay.⁸

The Polk administration early decided to join battle on the issues involving the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which Calhoun asserted had "gradually decayed after 1823 until it utterly perished." Polk, who in 1826 had regarded Monroe's message merely as an opinion of the President, in his first annual message (December, 1845), complaining of the principle announced by the French historian and statesman, considered the time proper to reiterate and reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine against "attempts of European Powers to interfere with the independent action of nations on this continent"—which he maintained should have "the right to decide their own destiny." He declared that the United States could "not in silence permit any European interference on the American continent" and would re-

⁶J. B. Moore, *International Law Digest*, Vol. 6, p. 423.

⁷⁴ *International Am. Conferences*, pp. 204-205.

⁸¹ Despatches, Secret and Special Service, pp. 19 and 27 (Aug. 27 and Sept. 27, 1848).

sent it at all hazards. He favored distinct announcement to the world that no European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or reestablished on any part of the North American continent." His reassertion of the non-colonization principle of Monroe was entirely approved by J. Q. Adams in a statement to Secretary Bancroft.

The intervention on La Plata was regarded with exceptional interest, because it presented a momentous inquiry "whether the United States would lift up its voice against European intervention in South America as well as in North America." The Polk administration promptly made inquiries to ascertain the purpose and effect of the armed intervention there.⁹ On October 3, 1845, Lord Aberdeen, in instructions to Pakenham at Washington, gave assurance that the operations were not undertaken with a view of territorial aggrandizement.¹⁰

In the meantime Brent, the American chargé to Argentina, without authority of his government, offered mediation in favor of Argentina, and his act was never publicly disavowed.

Secretary Buchanan, feeling that the principle asserted in President Polk's recent message had been flagrantly violated by the armed intervention on La Plata, instructed Harris, that, the United States, although under the circumstances it could not participate in the war, should cast its entire moral influence into the scale of Argentina in its struggle against foreign influence. On March 30, 1846, he instructed Harris that, notwithstanding the declarations of Great Britain and France that they had no territorial designs, he should closely watch their movements in that region and immediately report to the American Government any violation of the declaration by an attempt to make territorial acquisitions. But, because of the serious consequences involved, he was to offer no mediation in the dispute without express instructions from Washington.

At the same time Buchanan stated that "purely from regard to Argentina" and in consideration of its struggle against armed intervention of Great Britain and France in the concerns of the republics on La Plata and its tributaries, the President suspended action on the recognition of Paraguay as an independent state. At the same time, he sent a letter of censure to Edward A. Hopkins, a special American agent who, without instructions and at the risk of involving the United

⁹U. S. Mag. and Democratic Rev., March, 1846, pp. 163-84 (Caleb Cushing).

¹⁰15 Instructions, Argentine Republic, p. 19, March 30, 1846.

States in serious difficulties, had offered mediation in favor of Paraguay, which, by league with Corrientes against Argentina, would have become the ally of England and France in their designs. He based his disapproval upon two time honored principles of the United States: to refrain from interference with other nations, and to oppose the intervention of European Powers in the affairs of independent nations.¹¹

Harris, after nearly two years of the Anglo-French intervention by a blockade which he regarded as an illegal means of establishing political influence and to secure cotton territory in the Banda Oriental and exclusive privileges in La Plata, seized an opportune moment to announce the distinct dissent and disapprobation of the United States. On July 1, 1847, without instructions from his government, but with the prospect of getting the good opinion of Argentina, he sent a courteous but distinct protest to Lord Howden and Count Walewski "to assert a principle and to announce a policy upon which the United States Government would be likely to act, should a contingency arise." In his letter of protest, he said that the United States, acting on its own policy of non-interference in the internal concerns of other governments, could not sanction such intervention of one or more governments, and especially could the less tolerate "the attempt to enforce it on this continent by governments whose constitutions or political forms do not recognize the great conservative principle that the people are the true and legitimate source of all power." * * * "I must be permitted to declare it as my opinion that the Government of the United States could not sanction for a moment the establishment of any government or colonies, as political communities in any of the provinces of the Plata, by an European government."¹²

Both Howden and the Count, each inclined to throw the responsibility on the other, replied promptly in separate notes, disclaiming that their governments had any wish or design against the perfect independence of the Argentine Confederation or the Republic of Uruguay.

Advising the increase of the United States naval force on the Brazil station, Harris suggested that the United States ministers in Paris and London should make definite inquiries (regarding the pur-

¹¹ Special Missions, p. 235, No. 2, March 30, 1846; 15 Instructions, Argentine Republic, No. 39, Dec. 26, 1849.

¹²6 Despatches, Buenos Ayres, No. 13, Harris to Buchanan, July 15, 1847.

pose) that might at least bring a pause in the operations and give the United States a standing influence in Argentina.

Further action proved unnecessary. England discontinued the blockade, and France soon followed her example.

Harris, later, in reply to a hypothetical question, found it necessary to dispel the delusion of General Rosas that the United States would aid Argentina to resist France in case of war—although Rosas claimed that, on the ground that he was sustaining the American doctrine against intervention from abroad, the United States was morally bound to give him moral support.¹³

Early in 1846 (January 14), influenced by Polk's message, and possibly also by the affairs on La Plata, Senator Allen of Ohio, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, against the opposition of both Webster and Calhoun, asked leave to introduce a resolution asserting the unalterable purpose of the United States, by right of self-preservation, to enforce the doctrine of non-interference and non-colonization by European Powers upon the American continent.¹⁴

Although the resolution was strongly urged as an opportune assertion of a great principle of self-government in North America, and in opposition to the Guizot doctrine of "balance of power," which France and England were carrying into effect against Buenos Aires, it was strongly opposed and was laid on the table by a vote of 28 to 23.¹⁵ It was later introduced through the persistence of Allen (January 26) and was referred to the Committee of Foreign Relations which allowed it to die.

It was opposed by Calhoun and Webster and Clayton. Calhoun, although he admitted that the interference of France and England with the Government of Buenos Aires was a high-handed and unprecedented outrage, doubted the wisdom of taking under our guardianship and protection the whole family of American states. Declaring that the Monroe Doctrine was announced only to meet a practical specific case, and that it resulted in no practical benefits, and fearing to adopt a policy which might necessitate a strong military government to repel all foreign interference with the affairs of the American continent, he proposed that (for the time) Congress should be satisfied with Polk's

¹³⁷ Despatches, Buenos Ayres, No. 49, May 14, 1850.

¹⁴¹⁵ Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 197.

^{151b.}, pp. 240-42.

mere announcement without further action.¹⁶ He suggested that Senator Allen might give a test of his earnestness by a substitute resolution directing the government to interfere at once in behalf of Buenos Aires, and to be prepared to take her under American protection. "True dignity," said he, "consists in making no declaration which we are not prepared to maintain." Cass, replying to Calhoun's opposition against abstract declarations and paper bullets, and stating that the law of nations is determined by the practice of nations indicated by declarations, urged that "monarchical institutions shall not be extended to this continent by any influence, direct or indirect."¹⁷

Cass later said that the Senate, in refusing to consider Allen's motion, feared that to denounce interference would be interpreted as interference and might thereby lead us into entangling alliances.¹⁸ Senator Clayton later said that Democratic senators voted against the resolutions with the understanding that they were privately opposed by Polk, who had decided to settle the Oregon boundary question by the compromise line of 49°.

The events of 1846-48, which, by accomplishing American extension to the Pacific, brought a realization to the early expectations of Monroe and Adams, also brought the necessity of new problems and larger relations with Spanish America. A series of international problems, involving new American responsibilities and duties, resulted from the occupation of upper California, which Mexico was too feeble to govern and which, if it had been seized by a foreign government, would have involved the United States in an expensive war to maintain the principle of Monroe.

Among the most important problems near the close of Polk's administration were those relating to routes of communication across Central America. Even before the acquisition of California, the American Government accepted new duties at the Isthmus of Panama. In December, 1846, Bidlack, the American representative, negotiated with New Granada a treaty which (by Article 35) pledged the United States to guarantee the neutrality of Panama and the sovereignty of New Granada over it. Polk, in submitting it to the Senate, in February, 1847, although he recognized the danger of entangling alliances,

¹⁶*Ib.*, pp. 244-47.

¹⁷*Ib.*, p. 246.

¹⁸31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32nd Cong., 2nd and 3rd Sess. (p. 91).

suggested that the peculiar circumstances justified the treaty—which was not for any political object, but for a commercial purpose, in which all the world had a common interest.¹⁹ He announced that similar guarantees by Great Britain and France were expected by New Granada.

From a point farther south, also, came the call for protection. On December 9, 1846, Stanhope Prevost, United States consul at Lima, informed Buchanan of a projected expedition of General Flores against Ecuador to interfere with the sovereignty and independence of the republic. On March 24, 1847, Buchanan replied instructing him to assure General Castilla that the United States had watched with intense anxiety the progress of the intended expedition of Flores, from which he had never apprehended any serious danger, and had sympathized with Ecuador and the other republics which were threatened, as she always would in case of any attempt to interfere with the independence of any of the nations on this continent. He reported that Spain (through Calderon) had disavowed to the United States that she had ever had any part in the expedition—thus showing that she had for the present abandoned any intention of encouraging future expeditions of a similar character.²⁰

On April 29, 1848, in the case of Yucatan, which as a colony of a foreign nation he thought might prove "dangerous to our peace and security," and with the real object of preventing its occupation by Great Britain, Polk again asserted the non-colonization doctrine, stating that the United States could not consent to a transfer of territory, even by voluntary cession, to a European power.²¹ He considered that Yucatan by its position was a territory to which the Monroe Doctrine applied, although Senators Calhoun and John Davis denied that the Monroe Doctrine had any application to the case.²²

In the debates which followed, Hannegan said that Monroe "embraced in his declarations both the North and South American continents." Root suggested that Monroe had no authority to commit

¹⁹31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32nd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 252.

²⁰1 Special Missions, p. 255.

²¹J. Q. Adams said the South Americans as independent nations had a right to dispose of themselves. (Adams' Memoirs, 6; 186.)

Cass urged occupation of Yucatan on the ground that it had a right to transfer its sovereignty to European Powers and could do so without giving the United States any cause for offense.

²²Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 709.

succeeding generations by his declaration. Calhoun said Polk had stretched the Monroe Doctrine beyond the intentions of Monroe. Senator Niles of Connecticut, advising delay, stated that Monroe in opposing intervention by the Holy Allies did not contemplate intervention by the United States; and, citing the New England boundary, Oregon and British aggressions on the Mosquito coast and against Venezuela by absorptions of Spanish Guiana since 1841, and English and French interference on La Plata, he declared that the principle of non-colonization had never been enforced by action. He saw no facts to prove that the Monroe Doctrine was our policy; and, in referring to the Venezuela boundary dispute, he uttered a warning against assuming the responsibilities which would devolve on the United States by a claim to the right to regulate all the affairs of this continent.²³

Cass, who suggested that the Gulf of Mexico should become a *mare clausum*, considered action necessary not for conquest, but to protect Yucatan by the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. As Europe, after the Portuguese Government was removed to Brazil in 1808, would not have admitted that European nations might become the colonial establishment of American Powers, so naturally arose the idea that American communities can not become the colonial establishment of European Powers. The revolution of Spanish-American communities furnished the opportunity to assert the principle, based upon their connection with other communities of the American continent. In reply to the charge of inconsistency of principles as exemplified in the policy adopted toward French and English operations on La Plata, he explained that these unjust operations were avowedly undertaken to terminate hostilities which had long existed between independent states on that river; and he declared that "the time to test the true principles of American action would come whenever Europe should undertake wars for recolonization of any portion of the American continent, or which might obviously result in such a consequence."²⁴ Although he desired no union of American nations, or inter-American league or alliance, which might open the way for complicated diplomatic relations, he urged a determined policy of armed

²³19 Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, p. 610 (May 9, 1848).

²⁴Cass later stated that the affair on La Plata and Guizot's announcement relating to occurrences at Buenos Aires were inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine. (31 Cong. Globe, App., 32-2p. 91, Jan. 15, 1853.)

occupation by the United States, as a non-isolated world power and as the oldest independent state on the American continent, to prevent European Powers from obtaining in America new footholds which might involve us in wars in which the American states should have no interest, and which might later necessitate the resistance of the United States by force of arms. He held that such intervention, to prevent European intervention, was not inconsistent with the Jefferson rule of non-intervention.²⁵

Calhoun, laboring with logic, endeavored to prove that Monroe's mere declaration against European intervention, originally made in entire accord with British feeling and never carried into effect by resistance under the power of Congress, was an obsolete shibboleth, and that the Adams declaration against European colonization did not apply to worthless Yucatan, which had invited the assistance of England to relieve her government. Although, under similar circumstances and on grounds of expediency, he would have been willing to interfere in Cuba, he could not agree that the United States should interfere in Yucatan, even if England should assert her *sovereignty* there.²⁶

It appears from subsequent despatches from Mexico that the weak and declining Mexican Government regarded Yucatan as a useless and heavy burden which it would have been willing to see shifted to other shoulders as regardless of the political consequences of the change as it seemed to be regardless of its own stability.²⁷

On the day following his Yucatan message, and before the arrival of the news of the ratification of the treaty of peace with Mexico, Polk proposed to his cabinet the purchase of Cuba—a policy which was possibly hastened by the fear (in 1846–47) that England might grasp the opportunity to seize the island and the neighboring island of Porto Rico. On June 17 he wrote “profoundly confidential” instructions to Saunders. Introducing the proposal to purchase by reference to conditions which might result in the seizure of Cuba by England, in whose hands it would ruin the commerce of the United States and endanger the union of the States, he restated the policy of the United States to allow it to pass under dominion of no European Power.²⁸

²⁵*Ib.*, pp. 613-15 and p. 619.

²⁶Calhoun's Works, Vol. 4, p. 454.

²⁷13 Despatches, Mexico, No. 48, Walsh to Clayton, Sept. 13, 1849.

²⁸J. M. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 207-08.

Two weeks earlier, the matured Latin American policy²⁹ of the Polk administration was expressed by Secretary Buchanan, in his instructions to Appleton, in opening diplomatic relations with Bolivia, the only Latin American country to which the United States had not previously sent a minister. After stating that "We entertain a cordial sympathy for all the republics on this continent," Buchanan urged that "Liberty can not be preserved without order." Hoping that Peru in order to prevent future irritation would agree to cede the port of Arica to Bolivia, he urged that Spanish American countries, instead of weakening themselves by domestic dissensions, should try to act with a united harmony that would not encourage enemies of free government to argue that man is not fit for self-government. "The nations on this continent are placed in a peculiar position," said he. "Their interest and independence require that they should establish and maintain an American system of policy for their protection and security entirely distinct from that which has so long prevailed in Europe. To tolerate any interference on the part of European governments with controversies in America, and to suffer them to establish new colonies of their own intermingled with our free republics, would be to make, to the same extent, a voluntary sacrifice of our independence. These truths ought everywhere throughout the continent of America to be impressed on the public mind."³⁰

A similar expression of the same basis of policy was made two days later in the instructions to Hise, who was appointed minister to Central America, after the news that British ships, in disregard of the Monroe Doctrine, had (on January 8) dictated terms to Nicaragua on San Juan river. At the same time, after stating that "it is our intention to maintain our established policy of non-intervention in the concerns of foreign nations," he added: "But what can the United States

²⁹On May 13, 1848, Secretary Buchanan, in instructions to Mr. Livingston, minister to Ecuador, after referring to the failure of the military and naval expedition which General Flores (former president of Ecuador) had organized in Europe in 1846, said, "You will also assure him [President of Peru] that the intervention or dictation, direct or indirect, of European governments in the affairs of the independent States of the American hemisphere, will never be viewed with indifference by the Government of the United States. On the contrary, all the moral means at least, within their power, shall upon every occasion be employed to discourage and arrest such interference." (Moore, *Int. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, p. 473.)

Later in the year, after reports of English and French designs in Santo Domingo, Buchanan sent a secret agent (Ben. E. Green) to defeat the efforts of Great Britain to get Samana Bay. (1 *Desps. Secret and Spl. Service*, pp. 19 and 27 and p. 133, Feb., 1849.)

³⁰1 Instructions, Bolivia, p. 2, Buchanan to Appleton, June 1, 1848.

do to resist such European interference whilst the Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves by divisions and civil war, and deprive themselves of doing anything for their own protection."³¹

Senator Clayton, several years later, suggested that the Polk administration in its policy in Nicaragua had exhibited no great desire "to prove the Monroe Doctrine to the British." Buchanan, however, had already answered such criticism near the close of 1849. "It was not a moment to take a stand on the Monroe Doctrine," said he, "although neither Mr. Polk nor any member of his cabinet thought of abandoning the Monroe declaration, at least so far as North America was concerned."

2. POLICY UNDER THE TAYLOR AND FILLMORE ADMINISTRATION.

The foreign policy of the Taylor-Fillmore administration was largely influenced by the effects of the acquisition of California, which stimulated an increased interest in European international politics and necessitated better means of communication, better and larger relations with Latin America and the Orient, and a more respectable naval force on the Pacific.³²

Early in the administration, there was considerable discussion in favor of a change of policy with a view to closer coöperation with England. These views are expressed in a pamphlet printed for private distribution by W. H. Trescot in 1849. Opposing a policy of isolation and approving the earlier concerted action between Monroe's cabinet and Canning, Trescot proposed as a basis of American foreign policy an Anglo-American alliance for the protection of interests in the Far East against designs of Russia, a closer diplomatic relation with the foreign relations of European states, consideration of colonial policies, and intervention in the international relations of Europe to preserve the European balance of power in regard to colonial empire—in short that the United States calmly take her place at the counsel board of the world. As a basis of principles for American policy in Cuba, he proposed that the Gulf of Mexico should be under the protection of the United States and England, thus providing for the settlement of problems by joint counsel of the nations which had the largest interests, and avoiding the pretension of any other Power to inaugurate operations of conquest or to interfere in any possible contingency in

³¹15 Instructions, American States, pp. 51-61 (Guatemala).

³²8 Despatches, Peru, No. 27, June 12, 1849.

the affairs of that region. Fearing that the annexation of Cuba would lead to costly necessities of further annexation in that region, he proposed that the best probable escape from such costly necessities was the coöperation of the United States and Great Britain in a guarantee of the independence of the island.

Richard Rush, who in a memorable instance had participated in a useful concerted movement with England, and who believed that the United States as a world power could not be wholly detached from world movements and must modify some earlier rules of political conduct, approved the proposed policy of Anglo-American harmony and joint counsel, and even a policy of concerted movements, if necessary, and if the objects, time and manner of application could be arranged under the safeguard of our own approval and right of decision. But as he was aware that the popular voice, whether hastily or deliberately uttered, would henceforth decide questions of foreign policy before the Executive or Congress could consider them, and would be apt to proclaim absolute American ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico and on the American continent and its adjuncts, he doubted whether the large majority of his countrymen, influenced by suspicions of England and by an increasing self-confidence resulting from rapid expansion and the spirit of manifest destiny, could be induced to share with England a policy to counteract reactionary influences among any of the great continental Powers of Europe, however much the opinion was spreading that we could make all nations like ourselves.³³

The idea of an Anglo-American alliance in the interest of oppressed peoples was contemplated by Kossuth and others during the struggle of Hungary for independence; and the speeches of Robert J. Walker in England foreshadowed such an alliance.

Some seemed to contemplate a policy of armed intervention by the United States alone. A writer in the *Democratic Review* said: "We must transfer the field of war to the soil of Europe and change the issue from a contest whether monarchs shall beard us here to a contest whether they and their impious practices shall for an hour longer be tolerated there."³⁴

Among those who favored intervention in European affairs as against the traditional policy of the United States was William H. Seward. On January 20, 1850, he introduced a joint resolution pro-

³³Richard Rush, *Occasional Productions* (Phila., 1860), p. 143, *et. seq.*

³⁴*Democratic Review*, January, 1852.

testing against the policy of Russia and declaring that the United States in the future would "not be indifferent to such acts of national injustice, oppression and usurpation, whenever and wherever they may be committed."³⁵ Cass, although demanding a protest, opposed any act of interposition. Several members of the House declared that Washington's counsel was no longer applicable, since we had emerged from the days of our early weakness.³⁶ On March 9, 1852, Seward, still urging a protest against Russia, declared that times had changed since Washington and Jefferson—that Monroe had sympathized with Greece, and Polk with the French republic of 1848. To those who feared war, and the danger of secession in the United States, he denied that a protest would result in war and pronounced "secession a feverish dream."³⁷

The administration, although it maintained the earlier policy, was criticized for its attitude in connection with the Hungarian revolt. On September 30, 1850, Hülseman, the Austrian chargé, protested against American interest in European political affairs and suggested that such American policy might be exposed to retaliatory acts and inconveniences affecting the commerce of the two hemispheres. Webster, admitting that America had viewed with interest the extraordinary movements and events in parts of Europe since 1848 and might be pardoned for its affection for popular forms of political organization which had recently attracted attention elsewhere, replied (December 21) that the United States, consistent with its traditional neutral policy, had abstained at all times from acts of interference with the political changes of Europe. Referring to Hülseman's suggestion of hypothetical retaliation, he remarked that the government and people of the United States "taking neither a direct nor an indirect part in the domestic and intestine movements of Europe, were willing to take their chances and abide their destiny without fear of acts of retaliation which Mr. Hülseman had imagined and which could better be discussed after they should actually arise."³⁸

In his message of December 2, 1850, Fillmore, stating that the policy of the United States was to act toward others as she would desire others to act toward her, announced that he would abstain from inter-

³⁵Cong. Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 310.

³⁶*Ib.*, pp. 173 and 177.

³⁷Seward's Works, Vol. 1, pp. 196-221.

³⁸Webster's Works, Vol. 6, p. 488ff.

ference in the internal affairs of foreign Powers. In his second annual message, he said that the United States, whose true mission was to teach by example of self-government, and not by force to impose its form of government on other countries, avowed a neutral policy of friendly relations with all, but entangling alliances with none, and was "anxious to see the same forbearance on the part of other nations whose forms of government are different from our own."

On January 12, 1852, after the change in the French Government, Webster, although he regretted the overthrow of popular institutions in France, adhered to the principle of Washington and Jefferson and instructed Rives that the United States had no choice but to acknowledge the new government. On December 17, 1852, Everett notified Sartiges that the United States acquiesced in the will of the French people constitutionally expressed.

The increased interest of the United States in the affairs of the world determined the beginning of a new policy in the Pacific. On July 14, 1851, following apparent designs of France upon the Hawaiian Islands, Webster asserted the policy of the American Government and said "the United States can never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial Powers of Europe, nor can it consent that demands manifestly inconsistent with a *bona fide* independence shall be enforced against that government."³⁹

At the same time the administration found it necessary to consider the question of closer relations with other American nations. In his first annual message, President Taylor expressed the general policy of the administration in regard to Latin American nations. He said:

The United States stand as the great American Power to which, as their natural ally and friend, they will always be disposed first to look for mediation and assistance in the event of any collision between them and any European nations. As such, we may often kindly mediate in their behalf without entangling ourselves in foreign wars or unnecessary controversies. Whenever the faith of our treaties with any of them shall require our interference, we must necessarily interpose.

Possibly encouraged by this declaration, Venezuela in 1851 sought to induce the United States to form an alliance "or at least to take a more decided stand to protect the South American republics."

³⁹H. Ex. Doc. 48, 53—2. Sen. Ex. Doc. 77, 52—2.

The most important questions of foreign policy related to the region bordering on the Gulf and the Caribbean. On July 19, 1849, interpreting the recent treaty with New Granada, by which the United States had guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmian transit route, Secretary Clayton said: "The obligations we have assumed (by guarantee of neutrality of the Isthmus) give us a right to offer, unasked, such advice to the New Granadian Government, in regard to its relations with other Powers, as might tend to avert from that republic a rupture with any nation which might covet the Isthmus of Panama."⁴⁰ In the following December he authorized Bancroft at London to make overtures to Great Britain to accede to the guarantee.

Early in June, 1849, Secretary Clayton instructed Bancroft at London to inquire of England her intentions as to the acquisition of the Bay of Samana from Santo Domingo.⁴¹ In the following year, he agreed to coöperate with England and France in a mediation requested by the Dominican republic to secure peace with the Empire of Hayti. This policy was continued by Webster, sustained by a fleet with orders to coöperate with those of England and France in any measures short of actual coercion.⁴² E. C. Marshall of California said that in Hayti, by the appointment of Walsh to act with Great Britain, the administration had violated a principle of the Monroe Doctrine in our foreign policy the very clearest and least liable to dispute.⁴³ The "independence of Hayti from Europe is of more moment to us than that of Cuba," said he, "and the interference to protect the whites there is our duty and interest and should be without coöperation of any European Power."

The previous Cuban policy was modified. Secretary Clayton, believing that previous declarations to the effect that the whole power of the United States would be used to prevent the occupation of Cuba by foreign Powers had provoked counter-declarations of a similar character by other interested Powers (expressed to Spain against the United States), instructed Barringer, on August 2, 1849, not to continue the threats of Forsyth by which the United States had so long

⁴⁰15 Instructions, Colombia, pp. 121-26, No. 1. Clayton to Foote, July 19, 1849.

⁴¹16 Instrs., Gr. Br., p. 75, No. 10, Dec. 13, 1849; 16 Instr. Gr. Br., June 4, 1849.

⁴²J. B. Moore, *Internat. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, pp. 509-14.

⁴³31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32-2 and 3, pp. 71-79.

been bound, and to make no guarantees to Spain, but to leave the United States free to act at the proper time.⁴⁴ Clayton later said this revocation was initial evidence of an American policy not to agree to a tripartite convention with the European Powers for the preservation of Cuba to Spain.⁴⁵ On April 8, 1852, Lord Malmesbury, by invitation of Spain, and stating that England and France agreed with the past policy of the United States, and probably getting the suggestion of the idea from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, instructed Crampton to propose a tripartite arrangement disclaiming all designs on Cuba "both now and hereafter."⁴⁶ Webster, who could not agree to see a combination of England and France for the protection of Cuba, on April 29 instructed Barringer that Spain, if it would agree not to cede to any European Power, could rely on the United States to assist her in the defense and the protection of the island. On April 29, 1852, Webster, in a letter to Crampton, after declining to unite with European Powers in the interest of Cuba, said that "the policy of the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States."⁴⁷ Secretary Everett later indicated that the rejection of the proposal was based partly on the feeling that nature had made two continents with separate interests, that the proposed agreement was not suited for a rapid changing new world, and that the condition of Cuba was largely an American question in which the United States had a special and intimate interest, and a duty which she should be free to exercise without disturbing foreign relations.⁴⁸

⁴⁴14 Instructions, Spain.

⁴⁵31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix 32-3, p. 278.

⁴⁶44 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 114.

⁴⁷J. B. Moore, *Internat. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, p. 460.

⁴⁸*South Quart. Rev.*, Jan., 1854.

In submitting the correspondence to Rives at Paris, Secretary Everett explained that the policy of the United States was based upon "The steady rule of our policy to avoid, as far as possible, all disturbances of the existing political relations of the West Indies." Although he recognized that the United States had had an opportunity to get a permanent foothold in Santo Domingo, where the United States needed a naval station as much as any European Power, he felt that the attempt of one of the great Powers to obtain exclusive advantages in the West Indies might end in converting the archipelago into a great theater of "national competition for exclusive advantages and territorial acquisitions which might become fatal to the peace of the world." (15 Instrs. France, No. 56, Dec. 17, 1852.)

Late in 1852, Mr. Conkling, the American minister at Mexico, made an interesting suggestion of a policy of coöperation of the Powers in Mexico. Disgusted with the inefficient government under Mexican leaders, and speaking without instructions from his government, he suggested to Lavasseur, the French minister, who concurred, that: "It might not be amiss for the great commercial nations to consider whether it would not be both just and expedient for them by compact between themselves to assume, so far at least as relates to commerce, the government of a country whose pretensions to any capacity for self-government were so clearly preposterous."⁴⁹ Replying to the suggestion that such a course might result in discords between the Powers of diverse interests, he said that such discords could be avoided by carefully devised stipulations.⁵⁰

On April 30, 1852, Webster and the British minister at Washington agreed to propositions for the adjustment of questions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, relating to Indians and boundaries, which had been first considered in the preceding July. These propositions were accepted by Costa Rica but rejected by Nicaragua. On August 12, in a note to the President, Webster seemed to indicate that his mediation had been resented in Central America. "It has never been the purpose of the United States," said he, "to interpose, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the states of Central America, with a view to settle the controversies between them by any influence whatsoever exercised by this government, without their request or free consent. The mediation and friendly offices of this government have been solicited, and this request has been complied with and nothing more. Not a step has been taken to coerce either of those governments into any measures not satisfactory to itself * * * although it is to be deeply regretted that, for national purposes, they are not united in some form of confederacy."

The most important question of American foreign policy in the Taylor-Fillmore administration was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Secretary Clayton, a practical statesman, who later admitted

⁴⁹16 Despatches, Mexico, No. 7, Dec. 24, 1852.

⁵⁰At the same time, in reply to the Lavasseur statement that England had designs on Yucatan which caused her to interfere to prevent any adjustment of the Tehuantepec question, he declared that the United States would never permit such an appropriation so long as it had power to prevent, and that its ability to maintain the settled policy not to allow European governments to extend their domains on this continent was not likely soon to be diminished.

that he had never been a radical defender of the Monroe Doctrine, in negotiating the treaty, was actuated largely by a practical purpose to avoid a dangerous situation and to facilitate the completion of a great enterprise. He recalled Hise from Nicaragua because he considered that his treaty, negotiated without instructions, was an extravagant application of the Monroe Doctrine involving the United States in an entangling political alliance by engaging her "to guarantee to Nicaragua forever the whole of her territory and to become a party to her defensive wars for the protection of territory." Sending Squier to negotiate a treaty which would not involve the American Government in unnecessary controversies with foreign Powers, he instructed him that the Monroe Doctrine, which the United States was always willing and ready to maintain, was not inconsistent with a policy to "concede equal rights of transit to all nations" desiring to use the interoceanic canal.⁵¹ After the purchase of Tigre Island from Honduras by Squier to prevent its possession by Great Britain, desiring to relieve the dangers of a critical situation in a determined struggle for control, he disapproved the act. He warned Squier in the future to be governed by his instructions, "and particularly by so much of them as relates to entangling alliances with foreign nations." He then proceeded to open the way for a practical adjustment.⁵²

To secure the withdrawal of England from territorial occupation against which American sentiment was fixed and irreversible, Clayton was willing to share with her jointly the political control and use of the canal, with a guarantee of neutrality, based upon the doctrine of international freedom of transit, which had been favored by Clay in 1826 and supported by unanimous resolutions of Congress in 1835 and 1839, and which President Polk in 1846 had not found inconsistent with his notions of an aggressive Monroe Doctrine. On April 19, 1850,⁵³ he was successful in negotiating a treaty on this basis, which, although it was not intended as a preliminary step toward the repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine, became a source of endless misunderstanding.

⁵¹15 Instructions, American States, pp. 64-94 (Guatemala).

⁵²31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32nd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 254.

Sen. Ex. Doc., 43. Vol. 5, 31-2, Feb. 28, 1851; 40 Br. and For. State Papers, 1850-51.

⁵³Clayton at this time had a despatch from Letcher, the American minister in Mexico, reporting rumors and fears of British designs to seize Lower California for the payment of debts due British citizens. 14 Desps. Mex., No. 3, March 8, 1850.

When the treaty came before the Senate some objections were made that it seemed to involve an entangling alliance, but these objections were waived.⁵⁴

With larger political foresight, perhaps, Clayton by a firm stand might have obtained, as a condition of all negotiations, the British abandonment of the (Mosquito) protectorate over the "dependencies" of British Honduras (Belize) and thus would have prevented many later misunderstandings with Great Britain and years of controversy at Washington and London.⁵⁵

Having negotiated the treaty to secure the protection of the British Government to the Nicaragua canal and to liberate Central America from the dominion of any foreign power, he stated (May 7, 1850), in his instructions to American representatives in Central America, that the United States could never recognize the existence of any claim of sovereignty of Mosquito Indians in Nicaragua, and announced that the attempt of Great Britain to occupy, fortify, colonize or exercise dominion or control in any part of the Mosquito coast or Central America would inevitably produce a rupture with the United States.

The treaty was severely criticized as an infraction of the Monroe Doctrine, or as an entangling alliance with England in regard to the affairs of the American continent and for the settlement of questions connected with the United States.⁵⁶ By some it was regarded as "a ring in our nose which prevents us even from accepting voluntary annexation of any part of Central America."⁵⁷ It was opposed by many prominent men, who strongly advocated the acquisition of the Isthmian and similar possessions and urged that we should hold the gate to the Pacific and the keys which controlled it. It was strenuously opposed by Buchanan on the ground that it restricted the United States by the stipulation relinquishing the right to annex or occupy any part of distracted and disunited Central America which might become necessary for the security of the communication with our Pacific possessions. Buchanan said it "reverses our principle and makes Great Britain the protector of the whole of Central America, and establishes her influence there on sure foundations."⁵⁸

⁵⁴31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32-3, March 14, 1853 (pp. 263-66).

⁵⁵Am. Whig Rev., March, 1856, p. 276, *et seq.*

⁵⁶25 Cong. Globe, Vols. 23, 31-2, p. 263.

⁵⁷U. S. Whig Rev., May, 1853.

⁵⁸Am. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1899, pp. 95-102; Buchanan to Burke, May 30, 1850.

In the discussion in the Senate, early in 1853, Senator Douglas said: "The article inviting any power on earth * * * to enter into similar stipulations * * * recognizes the right of European Powers to interfere with the affairs of the American continent. * * * It establishes, in terms, an alliance between the contracting parties and invites all other nations to become parties to it."⁵⁰ Replying to the assertion of Douglas that the treaty repudiated the Monroe Doctrine, Senator Clayton declared: "I must tell him that it presents the only instance in which an European Power which had attempted to colonize a portion of this hemisphere, and to extend the European system here, has been induced by the action of this government to abandon the attempt."⁶⁰ Senator Everett, fresh from the State Department, and regarded by some as the valedictorian of the Whig administration, approved the Clayton-Bulwer understanding for the accomplishment of a practical enterprise through territory of Central American countries; and, in reply to those who preferred to treat with the small Central American republics for their protection, he said: "Looking back for a period of nearly thirty years upon the history of these countries, I can not find the time nor the occasion when we could have enlisted actively in their affairs with any prospect of doing them the least good, or without departing from all the safe and settled principles of policy of our country."⁶¹

In 1856, Senator Clayton, although he had repeatedly warned the Senate that an attempt to resort to the Monroe Doctrine would always be a failure, said that, if England broke the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by misconstruction, he would vote "to drive her from Central America under the color of the Monroe Doctrine," or under any other pretension which others might choose, in order to secure redress for injury inflicted.⁶²

⁵⁰31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32-2, p. 171.

⁶⁰31 Cong. Globe, 32-2 and 3, p. 255.

⁶¹31 Cong. Globe, Vol. 27, Appendix, 32-3, p. 285.

⁶²41 Cong. Globe, 34th Sess., p. 441.

In a speech on January 12 and 16, 1854, in reply to Cass, Clayton patriotically declared: "All Americans—those who regard the faith of treaties, and all who regard the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, would be united in the defense of American rights and in resistance to foreign oppression of American republics." (35 Cong. Globe, Vol. 29, Appendix, 33-1, p. 100.)

Clayton, in the Senate, later, said the issue in Central America could be better met by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty than by the threats of the Monroe Doctrine or of debates in Congress. Although he doubted not that there might

3. POLICY UNDER PIERCE AND UNDER BUCHANAN.

The feature which characterized the foreign policy of the administration of Pierce, and especially that of Buchanan, was the aim to achieve the long-desired result of securing our control in the Gulf of Mexico and the Americanization of the region thereabout, including in its scope the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the vindication of the Monroe Doctrine.⁶³

Secretary Marcy in a letter to Buchanan, Minister at London, in referring to Cuba, indicated that in accord with the Monroe Doctrine the United States, after unsuccessfully warning European Powers against interference to assist Spain to recover an American colony, would undoubtedly have recourse to other means to resist such interference. At the same time, referring to the annoyance to the United States produced by the Belize Mosquito protectorate, he stated that the Monroe Doctrine committed itself to the approval of the whole American people.⁶⁴

Pierce in his message of December, 1854, said: "Leaving the trans-Atlantic nations to adjust their political system in the way they may think best * * * the independent Powers of this continent may well assert the right to be exempt from all annoying interference on their part."

Some urged a clear reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and an announcement of policy by Congress in the form of abstract resolutions. On January 4, 1853, Cass, a persistent advocate of the efficiency of resolutions of policy, introduced a resolution:

That the United States do hereby declare that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power." And * * * they owe it to their own "safety and interests" to announce, as they do now, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent! That while the

arise a case requiring the application of the Monroe Doctrine, he declared "You can never prevail on Congress to go to war with a foreign nation for the violation of a principle laid down by Monroe."

(36 Cong. Globe, 33-2, pp. 835-36.)

⁶³Mobile Register, Jan. 1, 1858 and Feb. 8, 1859.

⁶⁴16 Instrs. Gr. Br., pp. 222-23 and 238 July 6, 1853, No. 2, Marcy to Buchanan.

United States disclaim any design on the Island of Cuba, inconsistent with the laws of nations and with their duties to Spain, they consider it due to the vast importance of the subject, to make known in this solemn manner, that they should view all efforts on the part of any other Power to procure possession, either peaceably or forcibly, of that island, which as a naval and military position must, under circumstances easy to be foreseen, become dangerous to their southern coast, to the Gulf of Mexico, and to the mouth of the Mississippi, as unfriendly acts, directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their power.⁶⁵

In the interesting discussion which followed, a strong opposition was expressed against a general warning resolution, which by some was regarded as useless and by others as impractical. Among those who opposed it was Senator Seward, who was inclined to favor the more specific resolution in regard to Cuba. Optimistically regarding the abstract affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine as a useless statement of what had already been accomplished by the higher law of time and national destinies, which made the doctrine obsolete,⁶⁶ he emphasized two propositions as a basis of a practical foreign policy:

1. The safety of the Southern States requires the United States to be watchful of the presence of European Powers or plans of European colonization in the southern part of the North American continent.

2. The tendency of commercial and political events invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere * * * balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe.⁶⁷

On January 6, 1854, Buchanan (at London), reviewing the conditions in Central America which threatened to bring the United States into a collision with Great Britain, incidentally stated that the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 would "be maintained, whenever, in the opinion of Congress, the peace and safety of the United States shall render this necessary."⁶⁸

During the entire period from 1853 to 1861, there was almost con-

⁶⁵30 Cong. Globe, Vol. 26, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 199.

⁶⁶"The Monroe Doctrine was a right one...because it was well-timed. As a practical question it has ceased to be. It is obsolete. You are already the great continental power of America."

⁶⁷Seward's Works, Vol. 3, pp. 605-18 (Jan. 26, 1853).

⁶⁸65 Despatches, Great Britain, No. 20, Buchanan to Marcy, Jan. 10, 1854.

stant apprehension of European designs or policies antagonistic to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and to the ideals of the American system of government. France, especially, sought to secure political ascendancy in Spanish America. In 1853 the Government of Ecuador urged eternal vigilance to check inroads of European despotism and to prevent vast schemes for European dominion in South America.⁶⁹ William L. Cazneau, in December, 1854, wrote Marcy that the interruption of friendly relations of the United States with the Dominican Republic had been due entirely to menaces and intrigues of French and English diplomatic agents, who, in their active hostilities to the interests of the United States, and acting as "mediation powers" between Santo Domingo and Hayti, assumed a dictatorial supervision altogether incompatible with the independence of the Dominican Republic.⁷⁰ At the same time Clay wrote from Peru that the British and French representatives had protested against the treaty of the United States with Ecuador (of November 20, 1854) relating to guano at Gallipagos, and especially against Article 11, which they alleged established a protectorate over the Gallipagos. Villamos, the French chargé at Lima, speaking of American designs on Cuba and the Sandwich Islands and other territory, said the French Emperor had determined to curb the spirit of the United States.⁷¹ Later General Flores, who from a safe distance was watching for an opportunity to get control of the Government of Ecuador, used his efforts in Chile to create an organization against American encroachment.⁷²

Ancizar, the New Granada chargé at Lima (December 20, 1854), suggesting to Clay (the American minister) that the season of common danger might be at hand, desired that the United States adopt a liberal policy of sustaining and protecting the nations of South America with a view to uniting the two Americas, morally and politically. Clay, referring to the increase of British and French opposition since the annexation of California, which made the United States the chief Power on the Pacific, and especially to French and English endeavors to secure political ascendancy in Spanish American republics, urged a more effective foreign policy in relations with Spanish America and

⁶⁹1 Notes from Ecuador, Dec. 1, 1853.

⁷⁰Special Service (Despatches), pp. 752-59 and 786-89 (Dec. 26, 1854).

⁷¹11Despatches, Peru, No. 239, Dec. 25, 1854; 3 Despatches, Ecuador (Confidential), White to Marcy, Nov. 24, 1854.

⁷²3 Desps., Ecuador, No. 47, March 31, 1855.

the establishment of the controlling influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.⁷³ He said:

Our position as a nation of the Pacific, the increase of our relations with the countries bordering on it, demand that we should manifest a greater interest than heretofore in South American affairs. We have neglected this too long. * * * We have never adopted any general policy with regards to the nations of this continent, beyond that connected with our declared principles of non-interference with the affairs of other nations—a wise policy doubtless in an infant state, but which can not be undeviatingly pursued when it has grown to be a great nation. * * *

The United States have arrived at a point in their progress as a nation, that we will be forced by circumstances to interfere in the affairs of other states, whether we desire it or not. The sooner the government marks out for itself a line of policy with regards to the republics of South America, combining more or less its interests with theirs and manifesting some concern in their advance toward prosperity and amelioration, the better will it be for the cause of humanity.⁷⁴

In Central America,⁷⁵ the fear of the designs of American filibusters created against the United States, much antipathy which was shared in Latin American countries, farther south and often stimulated by European counsels. Walker, after his attempt on Lower California and Sonora, sailed to Nicaragua to exert an influence as mayor of the palace. Other citizens of the United States, full of military spirit, and seeking adventure, followed. In January, 1855, Marcoleta, in a note to Marcy, protested against the "schemes * * * devised against Central America by these modern Phoenicians who assume

⁷³11 Despatches, Peru, No. 239, Dec. 15, 1854.

⁷⁴Senator Cass, asserting that France and England had recently acted in concert in opposition to every measure of American foreign policy (in Cuba, in Hawaii, in Santo Domingo, in Ecuador, in the Gallipagos Islands and elsewhere) said the United States should declare her rights in the Gulf and the Caribbean and its intention to maintain them.

(36 Cong. Globe, Vol. 30, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 20, 1855.)

⁷⁵To avoid boundary disputes, such as that between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which gave England an opportunity to assert her earlier territorial claims, Marcy favored the reestablishment of the Central American confederation. In December, 1853, he instructed Borland to express American anxiety to prevent European intermeddling in the affairs of Central America and to encourage Honduras to resist the British encroachments; but, desiring to be left free to determine what course to pursue, he warned him not to pledge his government to expel the British from the Bay Islands.

military titles * * * and grasp the sword and the musket instead of the ploughshare, the axe and the shepherd's crook, thinking to make conquest of the golden fleece which they believe to be hung and secreted amidst the briars, forests, thickets and swamps * * * under the by no means attractive and seductive influence of a pestiferous and fever-giving atmosphere."⁷⁶ Although the American Government was not responsible for all the "Land and Mining companies," it felt a natural tendency to austral expansion.⁷⁷ In 1856, Bell of Tennessee in the Senate said that the Monroe Doctrine had "become a doctrine of progressive absorption and annexation and conquest of Spanish America." Rather than annex Mexico and Central America he preferred to become their protecting ally.⁷⁸

In the latter part of 1856, Costa Rica, complaining of the policy of the United States in recognizing the government of Walker in Nacaragua, proposed a congress of American states, with a plan to make Cuba a free state with the consent of Spain and with the supposed purpose of an alliance against the aggressions of the United States.⁷⁹

One of our prominent American diplomats in South America (Dana in Bolivia), in a long reply to the allegations of Costa Rica, defended the American policy of expansion, and denied that the United States was preparing to annex Central America. He urged that the American policy was that North and South America should stand together and sustain each other in self-government.⁸⁰ A few days later, in a

⁷⁶2 Notes from Central Am., Jan. 16, 1855.

⁷⁷41 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (L. D. Evans, in Appendix, July 24, 1856).

⁷⁸*Ib.*, Feb. 26, 1856.

⁷⁹On March 31, 1855, soon after the negotiation of a guano treaty between the United States and Ecuador, the watchful Mr. White, after perusing the Valparaíso newspaper, reported that Chile, which through the efforts of General Flores had become disaffected toward the United States, would probably send to Quito a minister invested with ulterior discretion to enlist Ecuador in a Spanish American league against United States "encroachment." (3 Despatches, Ecuador, No. 47, March 31, 1855.) In 1856-57 the archives are full of allusions to the Spanish American League and to various negotiations regarded as unfriendly to the United States and to the general interests of republican institutions in America. On January 31, 1856, Peru and Costa Rica negotiated a treaty of mutual protection and guarantee. Similar stipulations were signed in Chile by Peru, Chile and Ecuador, and in Washington by representatives of Costa Rica, Peru, New Granada, Mexico, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Brazil (12 Desps., Chile, No. 34, Feb. 26, 1859).

⁸⁰1 Despatches, Bolivia, Feb. 28, and (No. 34) March 13, 1857.

despatch of twenty-four pages to Cass, called forth by the Walker expedition and the proposed Spanish American congress, he suggested that the basis of the American fixed policy should be the Monroe Doctrine and non-expansion southward (except in the islands of the Gulf) and treaties of alliance guaranteeing the integrity of Spanish America.⁸¹

By 1856, a more aggressive American policy in regard to control of transit and canal routes was indicated in the actions and declarations of the administration at Washington.⁸²

In 1856, after a riot at Panama, Secretary Marcy, in order to protect the transportation of persons and property across the Isthmus, proposed with New Granada a treaty for a cession of a belt of land twenty miles wide from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and certain islands in the Bay of Panama (*viz.*, Tobago, Flamingo, Ilenao, Perico and Culebra) for use as naval stations. A special mission was sent to negotiate, but it was not successful.⁸³ In September, 1857, Cass declined to form a triple alliance with England and France for joint guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, stating that a guarantee by the United States, in common with other Powers, of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, is inconsistent with the policy of the United States.⁸⁴ A month later he declined a similar arrangement for enforcing United States neutrality laws. Although the President expressed his purpose to enforce the laws against filibustering, he did not consider it necessary to avail himself of the assistance of other Powers to arrest expansion to Central America.⁸⁵

In 1858 Cass instructed Lamar to warn Nicaragua of the dangerous consequences which might ensue should she yield to French influence and contract for a canal under control of European companies.⁸⁶ When the Supreme Chiefs of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, on May 1, 1858, asserted that a filibustering expedition was preparing to invade

⁸¹Desps., Bolivia, No. 36, March 25, 1857.

⁸²Buchanan was elected on a Democratic platform of 1856 (June 2) which asserted the national need for the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, favored their application "with unbending rigidity," and urged that the United States could under no circumstances surrender her preponderance in the adjustment of all questions arising from the control of the canal routes and the inter-American relations incident thereto.

⁸³Sen. Ex. Doc., 112, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 4 (March 8, 1880), pp. 21-27.

⁸⁴8 Notes to Gr. Brit., Sept. 10, 1857.

⁸⁵8 Notes to Gr. Brit., (Private), Oct 20, 1857.

⁸⁶15 Instrs., Am. States, No. 6, June 3, 1858.

them under patronage of the United States, intimated that the United States was urging the annexation of the whole Isthmian region, and appealed to France and England and Sardinia for a protectorate, Cass replied that the appeal indicated a line of policy looking to European intervention in American affairs to which the United States had long since avowed its opposition and which it would resist under all circumstances.⁸⁷ He immediately made inquiry of France, who as promptly disclaimed any connection with a canal scheme, and gave assurances that she had no designs in Central America.

Cass agreed that the Isthmian routes should be neutral highways "for the world." "But," said he, "the establishment of a political protectorate by any of the Powers of Europe over any of the independent states of this continent, or in other words, the introduction of a scheme of policy which would carry with it a right to interfere in their concerns, is a measure to which the United States have long since avowed their opposition, and which, should the attempt be made, they will resist by all the means in their power." Stating the reasons, he said:

They are founded on the political circumstances of the American continent, which has interests of its own (and ought to have a policy of its own) disconnected from many of the questions, which are continually presenting themselves in Europe concerning the balance of power and other subjects of controversy, arising out of the conditions of its states, and which often find their solution or postponement in war. It is of paramount importance to the states of this hemisphere that they should have no entangling union with the Powers of the Old World, a connection which would almost necessarily make them parties to wars having no interest for them, and which would often involve them in hostilities with the other American states contiguous or remote. The years which have passed by since this principle of separation was first announced by the United States have served still more to satisfy the people of this country of its wisdom and to fortify their resolution to maintain it, happen what may.

Late in the autumn of 1858, Cass sent instructions to Mason at Paris strongly protesting against foreign protectorates in Central America.⁸⁸

⁸⁷*Ib.*, July 25, 1858.

⁸⁸Instrs., France, No. 169, Nov. 26, 1858; Despatches, France, (Confidential), Dec. 18, 1858.

Buchanan, in his message of December 5, 1858, said it was the duty of the United States to herself to protect the integrity of Central American territory against hostile interference of any other Power.

Near the close of Buchanan's administration, the critically conflicting views in regard to the interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which Buchanan and Clarendon had so warmly discussed under the Pierce administration, and which Dallas and Clarendon (in October, 1857) had endeavored to adjust by an agreement which the Senate failed to ratify (May, 1857), and which Lord Napier sought to adjust by two alternatives which the American Government would not accept, were finally settled by three British treaties (with Central American Powers) which proved satisfactory to Cass and seemed to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine.

The Mexican problem, which thrice had been adjusted by change of boundaries, still persisted after the Gadsden purchase. Complicated with Southern interests and largely under the influence of Southern statesmen, the remedy most persistently proposed for its solution, in connection with an American transit route across Mexico, was an additional reduction of Mexican territory by a new cession to the United States, or, if that should fail, the establishment of an American protectorate which was expected in time to result in new annexations to the stronger country. The problem, only partially solved by the Pierce administration, was inherited by the Buchanan administration, which continued to negotiate: first, for the acquisition of additional Mexican territory and territorial concessions as long as there was any hope of success, and later for territorial concessions and direct intervention (to enforce treaty stipulations), until the secession of the Southern States precipitated the beginning of the American Civil War and thereby increased the possibility and probability of the long-predicted intervention of European Powers in Mexico, and exposed Mexican territory to the possible designs of Confederate filibusters.⁸⁰

Concerning the condition in Mexico at the close of 1854, Gadsden wrote Marcy: "If the congress of American ambassadors which assembled at Brussels * * * agree in reporting the entire absence of democratic feeling in Europe, I feel called upon to advise the

⁸⁰Rp. Am. Hist. Ass'n., 1910, pp. 133-151.

President that the zeal and untiring efforts of the One Man Government now bearing sway in Mexico is to extinguish the last spark of liberty, ignited during the thirty years of revolution through which this distracted country has passed."⁹⁰ In April, 1855, he wrote: "It is imperative that the United States anticipate possible events in the East, which may leave the allies at liberty to concentrate their power in the American seas, and relieve the Mexican rule from apprehension of a premature alliance in designs not limited to one continent." Six weeks later (in May), writing that Santa Anna was drifting into an alliance with England, France and Spain on the Cuban issue and to check the growth of the United States, he advocated that the United States, as the exponent of liberal government in the Americas, should coalesce with the liberals, whose government had been violently expelled by a "one man military despot," and to interpose to prevent alliances hostile to the American system and to save Mexico to the Americas. In November, 1855, he informed Marcy that the allies were doubling their energies to win the new government in favor of the "Europeanization" of Mexico, and that it might falter and succumb to European influence if the United States failed to interpose for its rescue.⁹¹

Forsyth, who in 1857 succeeded Gadsden, considering the conditions in Mexico and the dangers from European expeditions, suggested an Americo-Mexican alliance by the infusion of Americans in the Mexican army. "What Mexico wants," he said, "is a firm and good master to hold her destinies in his hands and to save her from herself. Mexico can not furnish such a master and may welcome one from abroad." In the spring of 1858, the subject of a United States protectorate for Mexico was discussed in both countries. In view of the rumored alliances of European Powers, many thought the Executive and Congress should make a clear and emphatic enunciation in favor of an inflexible maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine and American control on the American continent.

Cass, having heard the rumor from Europe that Spain planned to attack Mexico to secure political ascendancy, instructed Dodge that the United States "will not consent to the subjugation of any of the

⁹⁰18 Desps. Mex., No. 51, Dec. 16, 1854.

⁹¹19 Desps. Mex. (No. 60), Apr. 3 (No. 63), May 18, and (No. 77) Nov. 25, 1855.

independent states of this continent by European Powers, nor to the exercise of a protectorate over them, nor to any other direct political influences to control their policy or institutions." The President, in a message of December 5, referring to American interests in Mexico, said: "We have never hitherto interfered with its internal affairs, and it is a duty which we owe to ourselves to protect the integrity of its territory against the hostile interference of any other Power."

McLane, who succeeded Forsyth in Mexico, contemplated the possibility of alliance with the constitutional government against the Mexican violators of treaty obligations. He continued to hope that the Juarez Government, which was proposing to nationalize the church property (the principal resource of the Miramon Government), would establish with the United States a political relation that would give character and force to end the strife which was destroying the empire, and to prevent the schemes of the clergy to procure European intervention, which was especially favored by the French minister as a means to circumvent the "dangerous expansive designs of the Colossus of the North" in its relation with the Juarez Government and its political policy on the American continent.⁹² The Juarez Government submitted a project of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, for protection and consolidation of democratic principles and constitutional government. McLane also submitted a project, but declined to consider the subject of a general treaty of alliance for interference with the domestic administration of Mexico except for America's own security and in connection with the protection and defense of rights that should be established between the United States and Mexico. Finally, convinced that on account of the feeling in the northern provinces the constitutional government could not at that time negotiate a treaty embracing the cession of Lower California, McLane wrote Cass that a treaty on transit routes (the Tehuantepec, the routes from the Rio Grande via Monterey to Mazatlan, and from Rancho de Nogales to Guaymas) with an additional article authorizing the United States to use its military power to enforce the treaty stipulations, would secure the ascendancy of American influence in Mexico and establish a government of constitutional freedom there.

Cass insisted that the United States should have the right to use her discretion without waiting for the consent of Mexico for using

⁹²Desps. Mex., No. 12, May 7, 1859.

military force to protect the transit routes. He also disapproved the suggested military alliance between the United States and Mexico, perhaps especially because it was "intended not for a temporary emergency but as a part of a general treaty whose failure it might endanger."¹⁷ The Juarez Government at first treated Cass's demand as an insurmountable obstacle to negotiations, but finally realized the importance of taking advantage of its opportunity, especially when informed that sooner or later the United States Government would be compelled to act without reference to Mexico or any other government.

By December 15, McLane concluded a treaty of transits containing the desired stipulations, by which the United States, without incurring the obligation or necessity of a general intervention in the domestic affairs of Mexico, was given a right to intervene in the support of its own treaty rights and for the security of its own citizens whenever Mexico should be unable to guarantee such rights.

Three weeks later (May 24), Cass announced to McLane the failure of the Senate to approve the treaty. Buchanan, probably suspecting the designs of the Emperor of France, and doubtless foreseeing that an attempt by the French to colonize any part of Mexico would almost necessarily involve the United States in a war with France to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine, was much disappointed. In his last annual message (of December 3), speaking of the refusal of Congress to give him power to use the military forces of the United States in Mexico, he said:

European governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should have thus been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force, should this become necessary, any attempt of these governments to deprive our neighboring republic of portions of her territory, a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.

In July, 1860, Lord Lyons submitted a proposition inviting the United States to join France and England in addressing an identical note to Miramon and Juarez advising the call of a national assembly to settle their domestic difficulties. Trescot, the new assistant secre-

¹⁷ Instrs., Mex., pp. 245-61, No. 16, July 30, and No. 21, Nov. 4, 1859.

tary, replied that the general policy of the United States was opposed to any interference of other Powers in the domestic affairs of an independent nation, and especially in Mexico where the President had recognized the Juarez Government as a constitutional one.⁹⁴

McLane proposed that the United States minister in Mexico should confer with the British, French and Spanish ministers in Mexico at his own discretion and opportunity in order to advise them: (1) that he would use his best offices to facilitate all efforts to restore peace, provided the right of the people of Mexico to establish and regulate their own government and political destiny should be respected and treated as a fundamental element of the proposed pacification of Mexico; (2) that while the right of all Powers to demand redress for all wrongs and injuries, and to enforce the demand, was fully admitted, yet the wrong complained of must be properly the subject matter for international reparation, and in enforcing the demand the political institutions of Mexico must be respected and not overthrown or changed. Cass replied that, notwithstanding the President's good wishes and desire for the exemption of Mexico from all foreign possession or control, the United States could not lend the aid requested by the Juarez Government; that the United States would not oppose advice by the European Powers to induce the contending parties in Mexico to enter into an amicable arrangement and establish a stable free government sustained by a majority of the Mexican people; but that if they should undertake to extort assent and establish European ascendancy, the United States would meet the attempt by armed action, in case Congress should adhere to the policy which had so long been avowed and publicly proclaimed.⁹⁵

In September, 1860, Mr. Cass, in an interview with Tassara, declared that the United States was utterly opposed to the possession of Mexico by any foreign Power and to any forcible interference with a view to control of its destiny, and that any measure for such objects would be resisted by the United States "by all the means in their power." Mr. Tassara gave the most explicit assurance that Spain had no intention of retaining possession of any part of Mexico or of undertaking to control its political destiny.⁹⁶

⁹⁴17 Instrs., Mex., No. 38, Aug. 8, 1860.

⁹⁵26 Desps., Mex., Sept. 1, 1860; 17 Instrs., Mex., pp. 306-38, No. 39, Sept. 20, 1860.

⁹⁶Moore, Internat. Law Digest, Vol. 6, p. 481.

Near the close of the year McLane sent Mr. La Reintrie as a special agent of the legation on a mission to declare to the Liberal leaders and to the foreign representatives the policy of the United States in regard to foreign interference: that the United States had declared to the European Powers her determination to resist any forcible attempt to impose a particular adjustment of the existing conflict against the will of the Mexican people, and that while she desired the pacification of the country, she denied the right of the European Powers to interfere directly or indirectly with the political independence of Mexico (and had gotten from them a disclaimer of any such purpose).⁹⁷ La Reintrie promptly informed the foreign ministers in Mexico that the United States approved the policy of the Liberals in regard to the peace negotiations of the European Powers, and "was determined to resist any forcible attempt to impose a particular adjustment of the existing conflict against the will and sanction of the people of Mexico, and also any forcible intervention, by any foreign power, which looks to the control of the political destiny thereof." "The Government of the United States does not deny to European Powers the right to wage honorable warfare for a sufficient cause," said he, "but it does deny them the right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with the political independence of the Republic of Mexico, and it will to the extent of its power defend the nationality and independence of said republic." The sequel to the story of persistent negotiations, which terminated in an unratified treaty, may be found in the Confederate policy to form an alliance with Mexico or to absorb it, the French policy of intervention in Mexico, and the American policy under Seward to prevent the execution of both Confederate and French policies and to preserve the integrity and independence of Mexico.⁹⁸

4. THE POLICY OF SEWARD UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON.

The general policy of Seward is well known. Persistently and vigorously declaring the right of the United States to manage its own domestic concerns, including the right to independent action in suppressing insurrection within its own borders, he also firmly opposed the intervention of foreign Powers in the international affairs of

⁹⁷26 Desps., Mex., No. 104, of Nov. 5, and 106, of Nov. 12, 1860.

⁹⁸J. M. Callahan, *Seward's Mexican Policy*.

neighboring republics. His official correspondence, a monument to his unwearied powers of work and his varied ability, is a credit to American diplomacy. In the face of despairing notes from his ministers abroad, he never despaired of the success of the republic. The simple inscription which may be seen on his tomb at Auburn fittingly furnishes the key to his service to his country in its darkest hour: "He was faithful."

Throughout a critical period, requiring unusual watchfulness and judgment to prevent serious international complications, Seward held to the traditional policy of non-alliance and non-intervention, although he probably contemplated a change of policy to meet emergencies which might arise.

On October 30, 1861, writing to Dayton at Paris, he said:

We have not been ambitious for the isolation of the new continent * * * but we are not insensible that it has the resources and capacity to rise, if unjustly wounded, above the necessity of the relations which it has hitherto maintained toward the Old World.⁹⁹

On August 8, 1862, in a circular to Dayton, contemplating the possibility of European interference or mediation in the Civil War, Seward said that the American republican nation must cease to exist when a foreign authority is admitted to any control over its council.

The nation, moreover, is an American one * * * situated in a hemisphere where interests and customs and habits widely differing from those of Europe prevail. * * * We have no voice in the congresses of Europe and we can not allow them a representation in our popular assemblies. All the American states were once dependencies of European Powers * * * have not realized their safety against European ambition. For this reason also we must be left by foreign nations alone to settle our own controversies and regulate our own affairs in our own American way. * * *¹⁰⁰

Declining to accept the invitation to coöperate with France, Austria and Great Britain in appeal to Russia relating to the question of Poland, he stated that the traditional policy of non-intervention, inau-

⁹⁹16 Instrs., France, No. 75, Oct. 30, 1861.

¹⁰⁰16 Instrs., France, pp. 230-39, No. 204.

gured by Washington, was an insurmountable objection to active coöperation, and although Washington had contemplated that the United States in later years might perhaps participate in consultations of foreign states, the foreign policy "could not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, amounting to a manifest necessity."¹⁰¹

An apparent exception to Seward's general policy was made in the case of the Panama transit route. Requested by each of two rival belligerent parties in New Granada to send aid under the obligations of the treaty of 1846 to protect the Panama transit route against the other party, and seeing the danger of becoming involved in the domestic struggle there, Seward consulted with England and France with a view to an understanding, requesting their views and inviting them to unite with the United States in guaranteeing safety of transit. This was made the basis of a newspaper assertion that Seward had solemnly renounced the Monroe Doctrine by soliciting the interference of Europe in the internal affairs of Mexico.¹⁰² On March 19, 1863, Romero wrote Seward that if the cabinets of England and France had accepted the proposal of the United States and sent land forces to the Isthmus of Panama, the result would have been none other than a European intervention, inconsistent with the American policy with which Mexico had been in full accord.¹⁰³

Although Seward recognized the American duty at Panama, he carefully avoided interference in internal quarrels of Colombia. In October, 1862, when the question of the separation of Panama arose, Seward in instructions to Burton said:

The President does not stop to inquire what may be the influences of the Panama railroad company. This government acts independently of all such influences. It has no part and it will have none in the internal political questions of the country by whose favor it enjoys the railroad whose neutrality it guarantees for ample equivalents.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹16 Instrs., France, pp. 376-80, No. 342, May 11, 1863.

¹⁰²Instrs., Gr. Br., No. 296, July 11, 1862; Desps. Gr. Br., No. 201, Aug. 1, 1862; 16 Instrs., Fr., p. 240, No. 205, Aug. 25, 1862; 52 Desps., Fr., No. 185, Aug. 29, 1862; 2 Notes from New Granada, June 26, 1862; 3 Communications from Agents of Colombia, Jan. 6, 1863.

¹⁰³12 Notes from Mex., March 19, 1863.

¹⁰⁴16 Instrs., Colombia, p. 52, No. 43, Oct. 28, 1862.

Again, on November 9, 1865, he wrote Burton:

The purpose of the stipulation (Article 35 of the treaty with New Granada, 1846) was to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign Power only. It could not have contemplated that we were to become a party to any civil war in that country by defending the Isthmus against another party.¹⁰⁵

In 1868, following the proposal of Colombia, which desired certain changes in the treaty of 1846, Seward sent Cushing as special agent to join the United States minister at Bogota in the negotiation of a projected treaty, resulting in a draft treaty "embodying the Monroe Doctrine." The new treaty, by which the United States would have secured the absolute control of the Darien canal, was approved by Seward, but was rejected by the Senate of Colombia and (in February, 1869) failed to receive the approval of the Senate of the United States.¹⁰⁶ Both Seward and Fish, not regarding the proposition for a change as equivalent to a notice of termination, later considered the old treaty as still in force.

Near the close of the American Civil War, Seward recognized the advantage of a moral coöperation with England in the development of Latin America. In his instructions to Adams on January 15, 1865, stating that the President had never failed to forecast the dangers of alienation between Great Britain and the United States arising from the war of secession, Seward said:

It is his purpose * * * to impress upon the habitual policy of the government a friendly and even fraternal disposition toward Great Britain so that the two nations may go on harmoniously together favoring everywhere the development of just principles of free responsible government and the progress of a human civilization, especially in Central and Southern America and in the portion of the Eastern World being reopened to western commerce.¹⁰⁷

In 1866, when the United States contemplated the acquisition of Tigre Island, in connection with the discussion of the northwestern

¹⁰⁵*Ib.*, pp. 144-45, No. 134.

¹⁰⁶Sen. Ex. Doc., 112, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess.; 4 Notes from Colombia, Apr. 23, 1867.

¹⁰⁷Baker, Works of Seward, Vol. 5, p. 414.

boundary question, Seward instructed Adams to sound Clarendon on the probable attitude of the British Government toward the contemplated American acquisition of coaling stations in Central America,¹⁰⁸ a proposition which might have been regarded as a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

Latin American nations, although they continued to be suspicious of the United States until the close of the Buchanan administration, changed their attitude in the period of our Civil War, when Russia became our best friend abroad and helped to prevent the other great Powers from interfering in our affairs. The Central American people, seeing that the causes which produced filibustering were passing away as the Union gained victories, and fearing the designs of all Europe, and especially of France, against American states, became more friendly to the northern eagle and anxiously hoped for the restoration of the Union. Soon after the fall of Vicksburg and the failure of Lee at Gettysburg some advocated annexation to the United States.¹⁰⁹

The Latin American mind, which in 1821 urged the recognition of the new Spanish American states as a measure which would "naturally establish an American alliance, capable of counteracting the European Powers and protecting our republican institutions," continued to dream of such an alliance. In the spring of 1862 Peru, viewing with alarm the international situation in the West Indies and Mexico, which she regarded as the beginning of a crusade for reconquest of her former colonies, initiated and urged a Spanish American movement to hold a Panama congress to form a union or alliance for protection. She and other states which favored the movement relied exclusively on the American Government as the natural protector and only guarantee of their further existence as republics, and felt that without the adhesion of the United States the alliance would have no practical result in a contest with Europe.

On June 4, 1862, Seward replied:

The United States, suppressing an insurrection which proposes to introduce foreign authority into our own country, sympathizes with the Spanish American states in their resolute deter-

¹⁰⁸20 Instrs., Gr. Br., pp. 456-61, No. 1745, Apr. 25, 1866.

¹⁰⁹4 Desps., Guatemala, No. 12 (Crosby), May 6, 1862, and No. 32, May 15, 1862; 2 Desps., Costa Rica, No. 86 (Riotte), Oct. 13, 1863; 24 Desps., Colombia, No. 273 (Burton), Sept. 13, 1866.

mination to retain their own sovereignty and invaluable republican institutions. Happily the most effective aid which we could lend them is being rendered by our success in defending a similar sovereignty and similar institutions against similar dangers.¹¹⁰

On July 7, adhering to the traditional policy of Washington and declining to enter, at that time, into the proposed Panama congress, he said, "A guarantee of sovereignty to South American states is inconsistent with the policy of the United States." Although he recognized that Washington's policy had not been enjoined as a perpetual one, but only as a policy to be pursued until the union or integrity of the nation could be developed, he said the question of according the protection asked was also a practical one involving a consideration of ability to furnish the surplus force which might be required. "Again," said he, "our own difficulties and dangers are present, actual, engaging, absorbing; those of the Spanish American states are at most but probable and future." "Moreover," said he, "the most effective aid which we can at any time render them is to be afforded hereafter as heretofore by the moral influence resulting from the stability and strength of our republican institutions. So far as the improvement of society, the increase of national strength are concerned, each of the Spanish American republics must of course work out the case for itself. * * * But the policy * * * is a policy of time, prudence, and peace, not of war and conquest."¹¹¹

Riotte informed the Government of Costa Rica that although the United States sympathized with the Spanish American nations in their determination, and was engaged in a struggle equally in favor of Spanish American integrity and independence, she could hardly regard the time as a proper one to abandon her policy, inherited as a legacy from Washington, to avoid entangling alliances.¹¹²

On December 1, 1864, Bruzual expressed to Seward the disposition of the Venezuelan Government to unite in the great Hispano-American alliance of the American republics for which a congress was being assembled at Lima "to oppose pretensions which Europe may have on America or any part of it" and the desire that the United States,

¹¹⁰16 Instrs., Am. States, p. 214, No. 18 (to Riotte) June 4, 1862.

¹¹¹16 Instrs., Am. States (Central Am.), pp. 225-29, No. 20, July 7, 1862 (Also see No. 25 of Sept. 17, 1862).

¹¹²1 Desps., Costa Rica, No. 44, Aug. 27, 1862.

as the first American Power, should be the center of the Union of the American republics. Seward, after various inquiries, stated that in such an affair the deliberation of Congress would be necessary, and expressed his opinion:

In the history and policy of the United States, its invariable conduct has been and is, not to enter into any kind of alliance with foreign Powers, but the United States viewed with pleasure and without distrust or apprehension the proposed alliance of Spanish American republics to insure their nationality and integrity and, while occupied with its own affairs, would show constant friendship toward those who are opposing political innovations on this continent.¹¹³

On June 2, 1866, when the allied states of South America (including Chile and Peru), in a war against Spain, expected the United States to assert the Monroe Doctrine, Seward said that, although the United States could not be expected to participate in ordinary South American wars,¹¹⁴ the American Government would "maintain and insist with all the decision and energy which are compatible with our existing neutrality that the republican system which is accepted by any one of these states (of South America) shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European Powers."¹¹⁵

At the same time, informed by Tassara that Spain had given conditional orders for the seizure of the Chincha Islands from Peru (although Tassara explained his government had not been influenced by the idea of acquiring territory or of intervening in the internal affairs of Spanish American republics), Seward promptly wrote a protest to the American minister at Madrid, stating that if Spain per-

¹¹³1 Communications from Venezuela, Dec. 1, 1864.

¹¹⁴"Those who think" said he, "that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican state on this continent becomes involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and unwavering policy of the United States * * * We have no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator. * * *

If there is any one characteristic of the United States which is more marked than any other, it is that they have from the time of Washington adhered to the principle of non-intervention, and have perseveringly declined to seek or contract entangling alliances even with the most friendly States." (Dip. Cor., 1866, part 2, p. 413.)

¹¹⁵15 Instrs., Chile, pp. 333-37, No. 9, June 2, 1866; Moore, Internat. Law Digest, Vol. 6, pp. 507-08.

sisted the United States must not be expected "to remain in their present attitude of neutrality between Spain and the Spanish American republics." This protest, on the request of Tassara, who was allowed to read it, was withheld, but Seward confidentially informed the American minister at Madrid to express informally the hope that Spain would not reoccupy the Chincha Islands, because such a proceeding would seriously tend to disturb harmonious relations between Spain and the United States.¹¹⁶

In October, 1866, stating the willingness of the United States to exercise its good offices to stop a war of Brazil, the Oriental Republic and Argentina against Paraguay, he said:

The United States feel that in a political sense all republics and all American states are sufferers by wars on this continent which are either unnecessary or unreasonable in the beginning or which are unnecessarily or unreasonably protracted.¹¹⁷

In September, 1868, after Brazil had declined the good offices of the United States in the interests of peace, and in answer to a suggestion for demonstrative action by the United States to bear on the unhappy war of La Plata, Seward wrote:

I think it proper to say confidentially for your information that the people of the United States are at this moment intensely occupied with domestic political questions. This condition of the popular mind practically excludes all questions of foreign policy and no thought of any measure which would require the exercise or manifestation of authority on foreign fields can be entertained. This may be different by the time Congress meets.¹¹⁸

Through the entire period of the Civil War and for two years thereafter, Seward had no more difficult problem than that presented by the Mexican situation. Confronted with European movements against Spanish America and anxious to grapple with serious international

¹¹⁶In the following May, Seward, in a confidential interview with the Spanish minister, said the United States was content that Cuba should indefinitely remain a colony of Spain, but must regard with very great concern its transfer to any foreign power.

(Moore, *Internat. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, p. 456.)

¹¹⁷16 Instrs. Brazil, p. 158, No. 189, Oct. 10, 1866.

¹¹⁸*Ib.*, p. 213 (Private), Sept. 22, 1868.

politics, he at first proposed a counter movement "to arouse a vigorous spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention, and warned Spain that the further prosecution of a policy of armed intervention in the Dominican Republic or any other part of the American continent or islands would be met by the United States "with a prompt, persistent and, if possible, effective resistance." Calmed by the consideration of the serious foreign problems resulting from the war of secession, he patiently awaited a more favorable opportunity for active resistance against foreign intervention.

To guard against the extinction of the Mexican republic, he authorized Corwin to negotiate with Mexico a treaty by which—provided the European Powers would consent to forbear from resort to hostilities in Mexico—the United States would agree to pay the interest on the Mexican funded debt for five years, taking for security a mortgage on the public lands and mineral rights of northern Mexico. This plan did not meet the approval of France and England, who probably feared that it was "preliminary to an entry for foreclosure," rather than an effort to maintain the abstract principle announced in the Monroe Doctrine, and was also opposed at Washington by many senators, who feared it might result in annexation. Later (March 2, 1862), in a circular expressing the views of the American Government in regard to the demonstration of the allies against Mexico, he said:

The President has relied upon the assurance given by the Allies that they were in pursuit of no political object. * * *

Nevertheless, the President regards it as his duty to express to the Allies, in all kindness and candor, that a monarchical government established in Mexico, in the presence of foreign fleets and armies, occupying the waters and the soil of Mexico, has no promise of security or permanence; in the second place, that the instability of such a monarchy would be enhanced if the throne were assigned to a person alien to Mexico; that in these circumstances the new government would instantly fall unless sustained by European alliances, which, under the influence of the first invasion, would be practically the beginning of a permanent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, at once injurious and inimical to the system of government generally adopted by the American continent.

These views are based upon some knowledge of the opinions and political habits of American society. There can be no doubt that in this matter the permanent interests and the sympathies of our country would be on the side of the other American republics.

Against the later occupation of Mexico by the French, whose Emperor was a master of words and an adept in ambiguities, he gave discreet warnings which could be quoted to advantage at a more convenient season in which the United States might be able to take a more active part in the Mexican drama. He was not slow to see the danger to the possible preponderance of the United States threatened by the establishment of the Franco-Mexican empire, which, conceived as a direct blow to the Monroe Doctrine, might ally with the weakened Southern Confederacy and proceed to extend French dominion southward from Mexico to the gateway of the Isthmus, where it might construct a canal and lay tribute on the commerce of the world.

After the establishment of the government of Maximilian, Seward promptly stated that, although the American Government, relying on the constant assurances of France, made no formal protest and had no purpose to interfere in the quarrel, the United States had not concealed her earnest solicitation for the well being of Mexico and her sensitiveness of foreign intervention. He urged that the interests of France required an early solution of the complications on a basis of the unity and independence of Mexico. "Nor can the United States deny," said he, "that their own safety and the destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America."¹¹⁹

After a series of similar utterances, Seward said (on March 6, 1865): "Our policy toward Mexico is unchanged. It rests with France to decide whether this is satisfactory. We shall defend ourselves if assailed on our own ground. We shall attack nobody elsewhere."¹²⁰

Bigelow expected his government to adhere to the doctrine of non-intervention in the Mexican situation. In the spring of 1865, in an interview with l'Huys at Paris, he said the success of republican institutions in the Spanish American states "had thus far not been such as to encourage us to attempt the propagation of them there otherwise than by example, and that whatever government was acceptable to the Mexican people would be satisfactory to us."

¹¹⁹On September 2, 1863, Clay, writing to Seward from St. Petersburg, said, "Whether we move at once to maintain the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico * * * there is but one opinion among Americans, and that is that the Monroe Doctrine ought to be and shall be vindicated." (20 Despatches, Russia, No. 19.)

On September 19 he suggested that the time had come for all America to unite in a defensive alliance to sustain the Monroe Doctrine.

¹²⁰17 Instrs., France.

When Seward returned from a visit to Auburn, New York, on July 3, he promptly wrote Bigelow as follows:

It is thought that the argument which you have recited in the passage thus extracted is not warranted by the instructions of this department. It will be well at your convenience to make this explanation to Mr. Drouyn de l'Huys. So far as our relations are carried, what we hold in regard to Mexico is that France is a belligerent there in war with the Republic of Mexico. * * * Our friendship toward the Republic of Mexico and our sympathies with the republican system on this continent, as well as our faith and confidence in it, have been continually declared. We do not intervene in foreign wars or foreign politics. Political intervention in the affairs of foreign states is a principle thus far avoided by our government. * * *¹²¹

After Seward, in a private note of August 7, again asked Bigelow to make explanations which might be necessary to remove any misapprehensions or hopes of l'Huys, Bigelow still felt it his duty "to avoid saying anything which would commit our government to extreme measures in any contingency." On August 21, in a long "unofficial" despatch, evidently written to discourage any contemplated change from a passive policy to one of active armed intervention, Bigelow said:

I think you will find, when the question is raised in practical shape with all its attendant responsibilities before our people, that with them the opposition to the extension of European influences in the Western Hemisphere is a sentiment which they cherish but not a policy for which they will fight. A war for such a purpose would become unpopular.

The abstract folly of making ourselves the armed champions of all or any of the Spanish American states, whose people belong to a different religion and who have been trained under social and political institutions having very little in common with those of the United States, would be aggravated now by the state of our finances which are likely for many years to tax all our resources to the utmost. The Spanish race in our hemisphere will require for many years a much more centralized government than we can offer them under our present constitution, and, therefore, it is hardly worth our while, under pretext of defending

¹²¹17 Instrs., France, pp. 393-95, No. 187, July 3, 1865.

republican institutions, to get ourselves into a war with one and perhaps several of the most powerful states of Europe.

I doubt if there is a Power in Europe that would formally sustain our pretensions under what is called the "Monroe Doctrine." * * *

In a war * * * to redress the wrongs of Mexico or to propagate republicanism by the sword, we would in my opinion be likely to fail. * * *

Our recent war was only for national existence. * * * Our government is based on the will of the people, who will not prosecute an expensive war for *soi-disant* republics.¹²²

On September 6, in confidential instructions of a more decided tone, referring to the basis of American opposition to France in Mexico, Seward said that

This nation has, at various times since its organization, found necessity for expansion, and that the like necessity may reasonably be expected to occur hereafter. * * *

We do not insist or claim that Mexico and the other states on the American continent shall adopt the same political institutions to which we are so earnestly attached, but we do hold that the people of those countries are entitled to exercise the freedom of choosing and establishing institutions like our own if they are preferred. In no case can we in any way associate ourselves with the efforts of any party or nation to deprive the people of Mexico of that privilege. * * *

It is perceived with much regret that an apparent if not a real, a future if not an immediate, antagonism between the policies of the two nations seems to reveal itself in the situation of Mexico. * * * The United States have at no time left it doubtful that they prefer to see a domestic and republican system of government prevail in Mexico, rather than any other system.¹²³

On December 6, in reply to Montholon's statement that France was willing to retire as soon as the United States could give assurance of a tolerant disposition toward the Maximilian Government, Seward said in explanation of American discontent:

We recognize the right of sovereign nations to carry on war with each other if they do not invade our right or menace our

¹²²58 Despatches, Fr., No. 158, Aug. 21, 1865.

¹²³17 Instrs., France, pp. 432-37, No. 259.

safety or just influence. The real cause of our national discontent is,¹²⁴ that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there which was established by her people and with whom the United States sympathize most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions. * * *

It seems to us equally objectionable that European states should forcibly intervene in states situated in this continent to overthrow republican institutions and replace them with monarchies and empires.¹²⁵

On February 12, in a note to Montholon inviting the Emperor to set a definite date for French withdrawal, Seward said:

The people of the United States have not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken and have called into being or accepted the so-called empire. * * *

The presence of European armies in Mexico, maintaining a European prince with imperial attributes, without her consent and against her will, is deemed a source of apprehension and danger, not alone to the United States, but also to all the independent and sovereign republican states founded on the American continent and its adjacent islands. France is acquainted with the relations of the United States toward the other American states to which I have referred, and is aware of the sense that the American people entertain in regard to the obligations and duties due from them to those other states.¹²⁶

Beginning with a policy "to leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own people," he advanced in 1867 to a decided threat of war to induce France to withdraw.¹²⁷ He formed a policy of his

¹²⁴Mr. Seward's note, of December 6, 1865, to Montholon, did not base objections to French interference in Mexico on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine, but on the ground that "the people of every State on the American continent have a right to secure for themselves a republican government if they choose, and interference by foreign States to prevent the enjoyment of such institutions deliberately established is wrongful, and in its effects antagonistical to the free and popular form of government in the United States." (Moore, *Internat. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, p. 502.)

¹²⁵Seward's Works, Vol. 5, p. 426.

¹²⁶Moore, *Internat. Law Digest*, Vol. 6, pp. 502-03.

¹²⁷Dip. Cor., 1862, p. 726.

own, "based upon the general doctrine of the right of American peoples to form their own governments," and against French hostility to the United States shown by the attempts to establish a despotic foreign government upon her borders. The result was a complete vindication of the principles upon which the original Monroe Doctrine was founded, and without any special appeal to the magical words which had fallen into disrepute in a preceding period.

On October 31, 1868, in a speech at Auburn, New York, after the acquisition of Alaska, Seward said: "The Monroe Doctrine, which eight years ago was merely a theory, is now an irreversible fact."¹²⁸

A year later, speaking in Mexico, he said:

What remains, and all that remains now necessary is the establishment of an entire tolerance between the North American states and the South American republics, and the creation of a mutual moral alliance, to the end that all external aggression may be prevented, and that internal peace, law and order and progress may be secured throughout the whole continent.¹²⁹

The CHAIRMAN. The discussion will be continued from 1870 to the present day by Professor John H. Latané, Professor and Head of the Department of History, Johns Hopkins University.

STATEMENTS, INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND OF MORE OR LESS ALLIED DOCTRINES FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT DAY.

ADDRESS OF JOHN H. LATANÉ,

*Professor and Head of the Department of History, Johns Hopkins
University*

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I shall not undertake to read a paper at this late hour. I believe that by speaking informally I can bring out more briefly and more clearly the points that I desire to make.

My period really begins with 1869, the beginning of the Grant administration, and I am supposed to bring to your attention the applica-

¹²⁸Seward's Works, Vol. 5, p. 557.

¹²⁹*Ib.*, pp. 579-83.

tions of the Monroe Doctrine from that time down until the present day.

The policy of President Grant, or of his administration, was outlined in his annual messages of 1869 and 1870, as follows:

The United States have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European Powers will find their interest in terminating those relations and establishing their present dependencies as independent Powers—members of the family of nations. These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European Power to another. When the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent Powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other Powers.¹

The time is not probably far distant when, in the natural course of events, the European political connection with this continent will cease. Our policy should be shaped, in view of this probability, so as to ally the commercial interests of the Spanish American states more closely to our own, and thus give the United States all the preëminence and all the advantage which Mr. Monroe, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Clay contemplated when they proposed to join in the Congress of Panama.²

This policy is outlined more fully in the report on Latin American relations made by Secretary Hamilton Fish on July 14, 1870, and I wish to read a brief section from that report:

The United States stand solemnly committed, by repeated declarations and repeated acts, to this doctrine, and its application to the affairs of this continent. In his message to the two Houses of Congress at the commencement of the present session, the President, following the teachings of all our history, said that the existing "dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European Power to another. When the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent Powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other Powers."

This policy is not a policy of aggression; but it opposes the

¹Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII, p. 32.

²*Ibid.*, p. 99.

creation of European dominion on American soil, or its transfer to other European Powers, and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American.

It does not contemplate forcible intervention in any legitimate contest; but it protests against permitting such a contest to result in the increase of European power or influence; and it ever impels this government, as in the late contest between the South American republics and Spain, to interpose its good offices to secure an honorable peace.³

You will observe that in this summing up of Latin American policy there are three points. Mr. Fish maintained, in the first place, that European dependencies were no longer subject to transfer from one European government to another. This policy, as you have already seen, had been laid down by Henry Clay two years after the original declaration of President Monroe. It will further be evident that this was not regarded as a self-denying declaration on the part of the United States, because the Grant administration was very anxious to annex Santo Domingo, with the consent of that island, of course.

In the second place, Mr. Fish laid down the doctrine that America would in time become wholly American by the voluntary withdrawal of European governments from this continent. That idea had been advanced by Charles Sumner in the discussion of the Alabama claims. It seems to us a most extreme position. He demanded that, as England owed us such an enormous amount for her recognition of the Confederates as belligerents and for the prolongation of the war, and as she could not possibly pay enough damages to compensate us, the least that she could do was to withdraw her flag from this hemisphere. He proposed that seriously as an ultimatum. It is interesting to see the statement both of President Grant and of Secretary Fish that they regarded the withdrawal of the European Powers as only a matter of time. They thought it was something that would take place by the voluntary action of European governments.

In the third place, Secretary Fish declared that the Monroe Doctrine was not a doctrine of aggression, of forcible intervention in any country, but the nation protested against permitting a contest between

³S. Ex. Doc. 112, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.; Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, p. 431.

an American state and a European state to result in the increase of European power or influence in America.

The Grant administration was occupied for a long time with the Cuban question; and in that connection Secretary Fish stood very firmly by his principle of non-intervention or non-interference in the affairs of Latin America, if it could be helped. You will remember that President Grant actually had drawn up a proclamation recognizing the Cuban insurgents as belligerents in 1869. He directed Secretary Fish to sign and to issue it. Secretary Fish did sign it, but he did not issue it. He pigeon-holed it. Grant left Washington after giving these instructions and does not seem to have noticed at that time that the proclamation was not issued, and did not take notice of it until a year later, when he thanked Secretary Fish for not having issued it.

On November 5, 1875, Secretary Fish took a step which came nearer an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine than anything, probably, that has ever been done by the State Department. Of the circular note in regard to the Cuban situation that he addressed to our Minister to Spain, he had copies sent to all the principal European Powers to be read and discussed orally. In other words, he wanted Continental countenance for intervention in the Cuban situation. The attitude of all the European Powers was opposed to it. It is interesting to note the difference in 1875 and 1898. In 1898, all the Powers, except England, discountenanced our intervention in Cuba, and England alone gave us moral support at that time, and we intervened. Members of Congress got an intimation that Secretary Fish had sent such a note to the Powers of Europe. They regarded a policy of consulting European Powers on a purely American question; as opposed to the Monroe Doctrine, so the correspondence was called for. Secretary Fish's reply was wholly misleading, and it was a very curious statement. He replied that no correspondence had taken place with any European Power on this subject. Of course, the letters and telegrams and dispatches which are sent to our representatives abroad are spoken of as the correspondence between the nations. The Secretary of State rarely communicates directly with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of any country. He either communicates with the diplomatic representative in Washington, who sends the note to his home government, or communicates with our diplomatic representative, who sends the note to the foreign government.

Strange to say, most people accepted Secretary Fish's reply. I was interested in the situation later in 1895, when I came across that statement, and it threw me off the track entirely. In 1896, during the close of President Cleveland's administration, some Democratic Senator happened to know that there was that correspondence in the State Department, and he called for it. It is a document of 154 pages. Secretary Fish dodged the charge of violating the Monroe Doctrine by saying, rather cleverly, that the Monroe Doctrine was not an American doctrine after all; that it really had been suggested and had originated with the British Minister.

Nothing more of importance relating to Latin America happened during the administration of President Grant.

We come down, now, to the Hayes administration. President Hayes, in 1880, adopted a new canal policy. He proclaimed the doctrine of an American canal under American control as opposed to an international canal, under international control, as outlined in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; and he said in his message to Congress that any canal that might be built connecting the two oceans would be virtually a part of the coast line of the United States. President Garfield reaffirmed the policy of President Hayes. Of course, this change of policy was due to the French enterprise that was going on at the Isthmus at that time. Secretary Blaine began a memorable correspondence with England, in 1881, in order to secure a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Mr. Frelinghuysen, his successor in office, continued that negotiation, and a very long and interesting correspondence ensued.

Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen both talked in a general way about the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Blaine in rather general terms, while Mr. Frelinghuysen appealed to the Monroe Doctrine by name. They claimed that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. Of course, when this government had signed that treaty, it was rather late in the day to be raising that objection; but nevertheless they took that position. Mr. Blaine laid great emphasis upon the fact that conditions had changed greatly since 1850, when the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was signed. He said that the United States had developed with such marvelous rapidity that we dominated affairs on this continent, and he said that we could not consent to the perpetuation of any treaty which impeached the right and the long established claim of the United States to priority on the American continent.

Lord Granville, the British Secretary, replied, simply calling attention to the fact that Canada had made remarkable progress during those thirty years, too, and, further, that the relations between the United States and Great Britain as affecting the proposed canal were clearly determined by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and that England would simply stand by her rights under that treaty.

Mr. Frelinghuysen held that the treaty was voidable at the pleasure of the United States, because the situation had changed so completely, and he claimed that England had not in the early days observed that treaty. Mr. Frelinghuysen did not, however, venture to declare the treaty void, because the British government intimated that if the United States declared the treaty void the British government would assume the position which it held prior to the negotiation of the treaty.

The move of Mr. Fish to secure European approval of intervention in Cuba, and the failure of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to get England to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty on the ground that it was in conflict with the Monroe Doctrine, were both rather severe blows to that principle of our foreign policy, and we hear very little talk in succeeding years about it. In fact, the Monroe Doctrine seemed to be on the wane, when it was suddenly revived in a most startling and sensational way by President Cleveland in his famous Venezuelan message of 1895.

Now, the interesting thing about President Cleveland's message and Secretary Olney's dispatch of July 20th, preceding, was that they appealed to the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law, and also the statement of Mr. Olney that three thousand miles of intervening ocean rendered any permanent connection between a European Power and an American Power inexpedient. A great many critics of the Cleveland-Olney policy maintained that it was the first time the Monroe Doctrine was ever brought up in that way, and some of them even went so far as to say that it was the first time that the Monroe Doctrine was ever mentioned by name in a public dispatch. This is absurd. You will find that Buchanan and Fish and Frelinghuysen and Bayard all referred to the Monroe Doctrine by name in dispatches to foreign governments, or to our representatives abroad in notes which were to be presented to those governments. It should be borne in mind, also, that Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Olney did not claim that the Monroe Doctrine was a principle of international law by virtue of its assertion by President Monroe and succeeding

presidents, but they thought it was merely an American statement of a well recognized principle of international law, namely, the right of a state to intervene in a dispute between two other states when it considers its interests affected.

While there was a great deal of criticism of the position of President Cleveland and Mr. Olney at the time, it is rather interesting to note the attitude of most authorities on international law and diplomacy on this matter. You will find that Mr. John Bassett Moore, in his *American Diplomacy*, says that President Cleveland's position was quite in harmony with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. John W. Foster in his *Century of American Diplomacy*, says that the fact is that Mr. Olney's dispatch is not open to the charge of undiplomatic language, and, although subject to some qualification, it constitutes the most complete and satisfactory statement of the Monroe Doctrine ever made. Mr. Lodge, in his recent book, *One Hundred Years of Peace*, says that President Cleveland, however much Wall Street might cry out, had the country with him, "and no one today, I think, can question the soundness of his position." And so on, with a great many other authorities on this question. I consider the language of Mr. Olney's dispatch open to criticism in a great many respects, but I have always supposed that it made a perfectly valid application of the Monroe Doctrine; because, as Mr. Cleveland said, the extension of British dominion on this continent, whether it came about by conquest or the extension of a disputed boundary, amounted to the same thing: it was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Spanish-American War was the turning point in our diplomacy, in a great many ways. When we took the Philippine Islands and later on intervened in China, a great many people maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was being violated and that we could not consistently adhere to it. I just wish to call your attention to the fact that the Monroe Doctrine never had any application to affairs in Asia. It was intended to define the relationship between the United States and Europe in regard to Latin America; and so long as we refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any European state, we can with perfect logic and consistency continue to demand that Europe shall not interfere in the internal affairs of states on this continent.

Let us turn briefly to some of the recent applications of the Monroe Doctrine. The signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was a turning point in the history of the West Indies. Indeed, it marked the formal

transference of naval supremacy in that quarter from England to the United States. Our advance in the West Indies has been very rapid since that time. The original Monroe Doctrine was nothing more nor less than a statement of a general protectorate which we proposed to exercise over the independent states on this continent. Now we have established a formal protectorate over Cuba, defined by the Platt Amendment. We have established a formal protectorate over Panama, defined by treaty; and last July Mr. Bryan proposed a formal protectorate over Nicaragua embodying the exact terms of the Platt Amendment which defines our relations with Cuba. That treaty has not been ratified by the Senate, but it is understood that the administration is going to take it up again, and we may expect to see in the next few years a formal protectorate established by treaty.

Mr. Roosevelt added a most important corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the case of Santo Domingo. He held that whenever it was necessary to throw a South American state into the hands of receivers, it was necessary for the United States to act as receiver; and notwithstanding the objection of the Senate he finally carried out that policy. In 1911 Mr. Knox drew up two treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras, almost exactly like the Santo Domingo arrangement. Two receivers of finance were to be appointed, one for Nicaragua and one for Honduras. They were to report to the State Department and file their accounts there. Those treaties were not ratified.

President Wilson has carried this financial matter a step farther in expressing opposition to foreign concessions in Latin America. Some of you will remember that in a speech last year he made the statement that we hear of European concessions or of concessions to European parties in Latin America, but we do not hear of European concessions in the United States. We invite European capital to invest here, but we undertake the work and carry it on and we pay them interest on their money. He said the time had come when the Latin American states should stop granting these extensive concessions. That speech probably had reference to the very extensive oil concession in Colombia, which had just been secured by Lord Cowdray, carrying with it the right to improve harbors and rivers and lines of transportation, and which would have meant the investment of millions of capital in Colombia. After Mr. Wilson expressed his opposition, it was suddenly announced by Lord Cowdray that he had withdrawn his contract. Some think that this is going

pretty far and that it is not an application of the Monroe Doctrine at all; but the logic is simple enough,—it is the same as the logic of the “house that Jack built.” Mr. Roosevelt said that the seizure of a custom house by a foreign Power, which would lead to a more or less permanent occupation of territory, would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In effect, he said that the creation of a debt which the ordinary revenues of the land could not meet, and which would lead to a seizure of the custom house, which would lead to the more or less permanent occupation by a foreign Power, would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The President has gone a step farther and said that the granting of a concession which would probably hand a Latin American country over to the financial exploitation of a foreign Power would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and, therefore, he has expressed opposition to the granting of such a concession.

While the Senate did not ratify the Nicaragua treaty proposed by Mr. Bryan, and did not ratify the Knox treaties in regard to Nicaragua and Honduras, I believe that all that region is going to be brought more closely under the control of the United States.

Just one word in closing. I hold that the Monroe Doctrine is like any other principle of law. A principle of law develops by judicial interpretation and application. A principle of public policy develops in the same way. It is utterly fruitless to go back and try to ascertain what was in the mind of John Quincy Adams and President Monroe when the original doctrine was promulgated. If you are simply going to limit it to that, the exact international situation that arose in 1823 can never rise again, and consequently we can never apply the Monroe Doctrine again.

Some want to make the doctrine hazy and shadowy and vague; some want to discredit it and some want to give it up. But I do not believe that the American people are going to give up the term or the name “Monroe Doctrine,” although it is vague and indistinct in many respects, any more than that the State Department is going to repudiate the policy.

The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be some evidence of difference of opinion in regard to the Monroe Doctrine in these days. Therefore, I presume that the period of time for the discussion may be occupied. I will ask all those who take part in the discussion to give their names.

Mr. PHILIP BROWN. Mr. Chairman, as I was listening this afternoon, I was reminded of a banquet that I once attended in a Central American country, when one of the speakers, in an enthusiastic way, proposed a toast to the Monroe Doctrine, and he said, "May it be as liberally interpreted today as it was in the time of Washington."

I am sure that this historical retrospect that we have been having is of a great deal of value in clearing up such hazy ideas as some of us might possibly entertain, as were entertained by the gentleman I have spoken of in Central America; but as I listened to these papers, my mind reverted to the fact that this is a society of international law, not a historical association, and that unless we can correlate the historical discussions of international law it would seem as though it were out of place for us to discuss the Monroe Doctrine.

But if we consider it purely as a question of statecraft, there are a great many questions in regard to statecraft that we might more profitably discuss in this annual meeting of the society. It has seemed to me that speakers, both this afternoon and last night, particularly Senator Root's remarkable address, have brought out an extremely interesting fact, and that is that we are coming around more or less to the position that the Monroe Doctrine is not a question of American policy and statecraft, that it is related definitely to international law, and, with all due respect to the distinguished international publicist who is acting as chairman, I would say that it seems to me that most of the publicists on this subject have been a little bit too cautious in denying that the Monroe Doctrine has any relation to international law and is to be deemed a question of policy. If we regard it, as Senator Root plainly indicated last night, as a defense of the principle of the sovereign independence of nations, it seems to me that we have put the Monroe Doctrine squarely into international law.

From sad experience in trying to convince some of the countries of Latin America as to what, precisely, we did mean when we were patting them on the back and asking them to hand over their business to us and stating that we would look after them, that we meant only friendship for them but that they could not run their governments in their own way or concede to foreigners such concessions as they might think of value nationally, I understand clearly, I think, the reason why the countries of Latin America have been unable to understand our position. It has been placed on the basis of an American program, an American policy, and it seems to me that the countries of Latin

America have a right to demand of us that we should place that doctrine on a basis that all can accept. From the Rio Grande down to the states of Central and South America, all the countries can accept this basic principle,—that all stand together as sovereign nations. Then the question becomes one of how all these states shall meet their obligations; and that, gentlemen, seems to be peculiarly a question within the province of this Society, namely, that we have no right to deny to European nations the right to make representations unless we provide a law on which they can proceed. I am sure that all realize that international law is very weak in that respect; and I would suggest as a topic for the serious consideration of this Society at its annual meeting a discussion of the rights of international creditors. That alone is a fruitful cause of diplomatic friction and even, at times, of eruptive relations.

The CHAIRMAN. There are quite a number of others here who are familiar with this subject. There is a Member of Congress in the back part of the room. Perhaps he would care to speak on the matter.

Mr. JAMES L. SLAYDEN. I regret to say, Mr. Chairman, that I have not had the opportunity of hearing these discussions, and I am not prepared to shed any light on the Monroe Doctrine. I only heard one or two statements made by my distinguished friend, whom I esteem so highly, but from whom I differ, and I would not like to go into a discussion.

My mind has been much more possessed with discussions of more acute questions, for the last few days. I will just make this one observation, that while our invasion of Asia has no necessary relation to the Monroe Doctrine, it does suggest to the minds of some people, to fair thinking men, that we can not very well claim for ourselves a privilege, and to ourselves only, on a great continent, and then invade another great continent and claim to share with other people of the world the control, ultimately, of that continent also; and I quite agree with the observations of the gentleman who has just taken his seat, that if we are to deny to the creditors of Europe the right to take reasonable steps to protect themselves, by denying them the privilege of active, personal and forceful interference, we ought to provide some way in international law for their security.

Mr. WHELESS. Apropos of the discussion that has just been had, there is no particular theory in the Monroe Doctrine in respect to the right of foreign Powers to enforce the collection of just claims by way of reparation for wrongs that have been done. That has been declared frequently by the several Secretaries of State. It has been declared in very forceful and in characteristically unique language by Mr. Roosevelt. We might insist that it is only limited, from the American standpoint, by the fact that such enforcement of rights must not go to the extent of a permanent occupation of territory, because that would be contrary to the basic idea of the Monroe Doctrine. The foreign nation has a right to seek reparation for its wrongs, to enforce the collection of debts by forcible measures, by arms, seizure of customs houses, or anything of that sort: that right existing upon the part of foreign nations to enforce the collection of their debts against American delinquent states is limited only by the fact that they must not, under the Monroe Doctrine, make a permanent acquisition of territory. We have had several recent instances of threatened reparations by forcible occupation that have been thwarted by the benevolent interposition of the United States, and, I think, rightly. The several Powers of Europe in their joint expedition against Venezuela, in 1903, was one instance. We have had the more recent and well known incident of the threatened joint operation of several European Powers against Santo Domingo, and the very just, and, I think, highly creditable action of President Roosevelt, even, probably, against the will of the Senate, in bringing about an amicable agreement by which the United States could do by pleasant and amicable and peaceful methods what those Powers were proposing to do by force; that is, administer the customs and the finances of Santo Domingo so that the just claims of these creditors might be satisfied without resorting to the wasteful and destructive methods of war.

Another instance still more modern is the proposed intervention in that respect in the case of Nicaragua, a country whose finances are in bad condition, with foreign creditors pressing and the possibility of military operations, which would put that country into an even worse condition than it is at the present time and waste its resources. Our policy in that respect has been criticized, but I think that such a policy should be appreciated and should be even welcomed when these republics in the south are threatened by their creditors with hostile military operations for the purpose of forcing collection of debts. Why

is it not, then, much better, much more creditable to all parties concerned, and greatly to the advantage of them all, that the United States should, in a sense of intervention, settle it by saying, "You do not know how to settle your affairs. We will do it for you?"

Why is it not to be desired and welcomed that the United States should offer its good offices to these foreign creditors and ask to be permitted, with the consent of the government of the Latin American state that is interested, to appoint a capable and competent man, approved by those governments, to go in there and administer the revenues and conserve the resources that are being wasted, in some instances, and which would be still further wasted by the ravages of war, and pay off these debts? It is a sort of an international receivership. A creditor has a right to attach property and sell it at public sale; and an international creditor has a right to work out his just credit.

Therefore, I think the policy of the United States, which is becoming more and more general, should be a well recognized and approved policy of offering its immediate offices to go into these countries to prevent forcible seizure and war between European nations and Latin American republics and, by amicable and peaceful methods, adjust their financial difficulties to the credit and the benefit and the honor of all concerned.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I do not arise to participate in this discussion, but merely to refer to a statement made by Mr. LATANÉ, who said that Secretaries of State do not, as a matter of fact, deal directly with their colleagues in the different countries. Such a communication is rare; it is the exception; but it does now and then take place. When I had the honor to be connected with the Department of State, the ordinary channels of communication had been used in the case of a dispute between this government and Nicaragua without satisfactory results. Whereupon Mr. Root communicated directly with the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs. I merely call that to your attention in order to show that although it is not the regular rule, it is within the discretion of the Secretary of State and that that discretion has now and then been exercised and acts as a precedent for future action.

Mr. LATANÉ. Was that written to him direct?

Mr. SCOTT. The Secretary of State in Washington sent his communication directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nicaragua.

Mr. HOYNES. Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that on account of the fact that it is rather late it would be somewhat imprudent for us to go into the discussion of this subject at the present time. The matter will still be dealt with, I believe, tomorrow, and perhaps then, after we have heard the other speakers who are going into the matter, it will enable us to know better what the Monroe Doctrine is from the point of view of the speakers and the diplomats at the present time. I suggest that we adjourn, and I make a motion to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. That motion would be entirely in order, as there is only one minute left between now and the period when it is necessary to adjourn.

Mr. WILLIAM I. HULL. Is there any reason, Mr. Chairman, why the Committee on Arrangements prefer that we should meet tomorrow at ten o'clock rather than at ten thirty? There is a committee which has hard and important work to perform, which will meet at nine o'clock, and if you can give us an additional half hour tomorrow morning I think it will be of much service.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Hull makes the request that the session tomorrow morning begin at ten thirty instead of at ten, in order to allow more time for a committee that must meet at nine o'clock for the consideration of certain important questions. Do you make that as a motion?

Mr. HULL. I make that motion, Mr. Chairman.

The question on the motion of meeting tomorrow at 10:30, instead of at 10 o'clock, being duly seconded, was put and carried.

The motion to adjourn, being duly seconded, was then put and carried.

Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p.m., an adjournment was taken until 8 o'clock p.m.